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Appendix:  Remedial Self-Help and "State Action"
In Part I of this  Article,1  I described  and set  about to  criticize  a
rule regarding claims by indigent persons  to be relieved of court access
fees,  a rule  which  seems  to  be  emerging  from recent  decisions  of the
United  States  Supreme Court.'  The  emergent  rule,  as I  described  it,
"defines -a  subgroup  (call it X) of all persons, such that whenever a per-
son is within X, that person is denied due process if he is refused access to
*  This  is  Part  II  of  a  two-part  essay.  Part  I  appeared  in  issue No.  6  of  the
1973 Duke Law Journal.
t  Professor  of  Law,  Harvard  University.  B.A.  1957,  Yale  University;  LL.B.
1960, Harvard University.
1.  Michelman,  The  Supreme  Court and  Litigation Access  Fees:  The  Right  to
Protect One's Rights-Part  1,  1973 DuKE L.J. 1153  [hereinafter cited  as Part  1].
2.  Ortwein  v. Schwab,  410 U.S.  656  (1973);  United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.  434
(1973);  Boddie v. Connecticut,  401 U.S.  371 (1971).DUKE  LAW  JOURNAL
court because of inability to pay a state-imposed fee"; and X, under the
emergent rule, "means any of the following:  a defendant in criminal pro-
ceedings, a defendant in civil proceedings, or a plaintiff in civil proceed-
ings  seeking  vindication  of a constitutionally  favored  or  'fundamental'
interest where relief is unobtainable  extrajudicially."  My aim in Part I
was not to appraise  the  emergent  rule's  soundness  or  necessity  as  an
elaboration  of prior  legal  doctrine  and  precedent,  but  rather  was  to
show that there is "no combination of plausible moral principles"  which
can  explain  or justify a rule that accords protection  to  members  of X
but  withholds  protection  from  certain  other  civil  plaintiffs-a  group
of others which  turns out to be "so  broad and inclusive that one might
as  well  refer  to  civil  plaintiffs  generally."  Such  a  showing,  I  said,
"will  not itself  establish that indigent civil  plaintiffs  generally  are  con-
stitutionally  entitled  to  access-fee  relief,  but  it will  be  an  important
step along the way."'
The  discussion now  shifts its focus  from the realm  of moral prin-
ciple to that of legal doctrine, including constitutional  texts  and related
judicial  holdings.  I  do not  wish  to  suggest  that the two  realms  can
ultimately be held  apart.  To the  contrary,  I would  affirm that judges
elaborating  doctrine, and critics of the judicial product,  must  strive  to
produce  a  collection  of  holdings  or  equivalent  statements  which  are
appreciably  coherent;  and I  do  not know  what  could  impart  coher-
ence to  a body of doctrinal  statements  save their joint consistency  with
some  body  of  principle  not  wholly  accessible  through  the  statements
alone,  and  in that sense  external  to the  statements.  I  accept that the
principles  which can impart needed coherence  to judicial  holdings  and
dicta need not be static ones, but may be  always evolving and not fully
discoverable  or  determinable  at  any  given  moment.4   From  this  it
seems to follow that criticism  appealing to principles  must often be in-
conclusive.  Decisions  which appear inexplicable  in terms  of currently
understood  principle  may  be  signs  that  the  evolution  of  principles
continues and a new synthesis impends.
But not  every judicial  decision  which  seems discordant  within an
extant ,theoretical environment must be received as a harbinger of some
brave new reconceptualization.  To be sure, one  might boldly imagine
that the Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein decisions,  with  their emphasis  on
the possibility  of out-of-court  interchange  between the  disputants  as  a
way of  resolving  claims  of right,  foreshadow  a  new,  reigning  concep-
tion  of legal  rights  as  expressions  of  publicly  shared  values  to  which
3.  Part  I at 1169-70.
4.  See  Dworkin,  The  Original Position, 40 U. Cm. L. Rav.  500,  509-14  (1973).
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voluntary  acquiescence  can normally  be expected  and  which,  indeed,
can be fully realized only through voluntary acquiescence.  Such an in-
terpretation could not be refuted merely by showing that other, roughly
contemporaneous  decisions  seem  to point in -a different  direction.5   A
more  fundamental  hindrance  to  seeing  -the notion  of  rights-as-shared-
values  as  an  inspiration for the  access-fee  decisions,  might be  that the
notion  clashes with  a vision  of  human nature  and associated  concepts
of law, rights,  and the judicial role, which  seem implicit in the Court's
assumption of the very powers  of constitutional  review  it has  been  ex-
ercising  in  these  cases."  The  Constitution  calls  itself  supreme  "law,"
and  it  purports  to establish  "rights"  (and  such  cognate  or  subsidiary
entities as "liberty,"  "property,"  and certain "freedoms").  Judicial  re-
view  of  executive  and  legislative  action  evidently  proceeds  upon  the
belief  that "law"  and  "rights"  necessarily  entail  authoritative  interpre-
tation  and  enforcement  by  an  entity  standing  dispassionately  outside
the  context  of  interaction  which  has  brought  the  claimed  law  or
right into question;  and it thus harmonizes with a vision of human na-
ture,  well  established  in the  liberal  tradition,  which  inclines  us to  a
workaday  understanding  of  law  and  rights  not  as  the  product  of
shared  values  but as limited,  tactical  sacrifices  of  freedom,  made  for
the  sake  of  maximizing  freedom  generally  by  forcibly  protecting  it
against the worse incursions of unruly humanity.'
Aside  from the  dim  possibility that they  betoken  some profound
alteration  of  theoretical  perspective,  the  access-fee  decisions  can  be
counted  wrong if  they  are  inexplicable  in terms  of currently  available
principle,  as  that  is  reflected  in  contemporaneous  doctrine.  Having
focused  in Part I  on issues  of principle  considered  without  regard  to
5.  See,  e.g.,  Board  of Regents  of  State  Colleges  v.  Roth,  408  U.S.  564  (1972),
where the  Court can be understood  as saying that  legally  compelled  disclosure  and  ex-
planation  by  officials  of  their  reasons  for treating  a citizen  adversely,  accompanied  by
opportunity  for  the  citizen  to  participate  in  examining  those  reasons,  serves  a  useful
purpose  and  therefore  is  required  by the  due  process  guaranty  only  where  the  citizen
has  some judicially enforceable  right at  stake.  This  view of  the Roth case  is  developed
and  explored  in  an  essay  I  am  preparing  for  NoMos  (to  be  published  by  Atherton
Press, New York, late 1974).
6.  See  Cooper  v.  Aaron,  358  U.S.  1,  17-18  (1958)  (opinion  of  the  Court);  id.
at  21-25  (Frankfurter,  J.,  concurring);  Van Alstyne,  A  Critical Guide to  Marbury v.
Madison, 1969 DuKE L.L  1, 21-29.
7.  See Kennedy,  Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL  STumns  351  (1973).  Compare Mi-
chelman, In Pursuit of  Constitutional Welfare Rights:  One  View  of  Rawls'  Theory  of
Justice, 121  U.  PA.  L.  REv.  962,  993-98  (1973).  That there  may be  certain  cases  in
which legal  rights are conceived to exist naked  of judicial  remedies-for  example,  cases
involving  sovereign  immunity  or  "political questions"--does  not contradict  my  general
statement.  Indeed,  the  fact  that  these  cases  are  so  terribly  vexing  and  problematic
tends to confirm that statement.
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equal protection clauses,  for judicial protection  of personal interests  or
rights.  The  methodology  is  distinguished  by  two  characteristics:  (i)
it  allows for  varying  degrees  of  judicial  protection-varying  levels  of
"strictness"  of  review--depending  on  what  right  or  interest  it is  for
which protection  is claimed;  and  (ii)  it -ranks or  classifies rights  and
interests, for this purpose, according to the clarity and force with which
-the Constitution-either  specific  texts or the whole  constitutional plan
-seems  to single out various rights  and interests  as needing or deserv-
ing  special  protection.  The  notion  of  strictness  of  review  itself  is
treated  as  containing  two  subquestions:  (a)  What  governmental  ob-
jectives,  or what sorts of objectives,  will be allowed to count as reasons
for  encroaching  on  the  protected  interest  or  right,  and  (b)  how
"tight  a  fit  will be  required  between  the  government's  justifying  ob-
jective  and its  questioned practice?  (How insistent will  the  Court be
on resort to "the least restrictive alternative"?)
Much  recent  discussion  about  this  methodology  has  considered
whether  the  two  major  dimensions-nature  of  the  interest,  strictness
of review-are  or ought to be treated  as  calling for relativistic  evalu-
ation along continuous, bi-polar  scales,  or rather  as  posing  "either-or"
questions  of  assignment  to  dichotomous  categories. 1 0  In  the  "two-
tiered"  or  "either-or"  version,  an  interest  either  is  or isn't  classed  as
"fundamental,"  while review is either "strict" or "loose."  A fundamen-
tal interest  begets strict  review;  other  interests  occasion  only  loose re-
view.  In the  "continuous"  version,  the  closer  an  interest  lies  to  the
"fundamental"  pole,  the  stricter  the  review  it evokes.  Also  possible
are  hybrid  versions,  as  well  as  conceptions  of  altogether  greater  so-
phistication  and  complexity.1   For  example,  one  significant  variant
seems  to  be  that  in  which  (i)  an  either-or  question  is  asked  about
whether an interest has  received  any special  recognition in the Consti-
tution;  (ii)  if  the  answer  is  no,  review  is  denied  entirely;  and  (iii) if
the  answer is  yes,  review is  to be substantial,  with  its specific  content
and strategy shaped by the nature  and importance  of the  interest.'"
A minimally  activist,  maximally  modest formulation  of  a  general
rule  issuing  from  the  evolving  methodology  in  any  of  its  versions
10.  See,  e.g., Gunther, Foreword: In  Search of Evolving Doctrine on  a  Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal  Protection, 86 HARv.  L.  REv. 1  (1972).
11.  See  Tribe, Foreword:  Toward a  Model of  Roles in  the Due Process 'of Life
and Law, 87 HAuv. L. Rv. 1 (1973).
12.  A  very  recent  decision  which  suggests  this  hybrid  is  Cleveland  Bd.  of  Educ.
v. LaFleur, 94 S.  Ct.  791  (1974).  See also Nowack,  Realigning the Standards of Re-
view  Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,  Neutral, and Permissive Clas-
sification, 62 GEo.  L.J. 1071  (1974).
Vol.  1974:527]DUKE  LAW  JOURNAL
might  be:  governmental  practices  which  hamper  enjoyment  of consti-
tutionally  recognized  ("protected")  rights  and  interests  are  unsupport-
able if the practices  could be  altered so as  to reduce  significantly  their
hampering  effects,  without  jeopardizing  any  substantial  governmental
interest  over  and  above  the  interest  in  convenience  and  efficiency  of
internal  administration.1"  An  ostensible  corollary  of  this  rule,  one
which  received special  attention  and explicit restatement  in the Rodri-
guez opinion,  is  that  the  charging  of fees  by  the  government  for  the
exercise  of  protected  rights  or  enjoyment  of  protected  interests  is  a
highly  suspect practice  insofar  as  the fees  are imposed with  exclusion-
ary  effect.
14
I  shall  be  trying  to  show  that  a person's  interest  in obtaining  a
fair  hearing,  when  he  claims  that  a legal  entitlement  of his  has  been
violated,  is  one  of  those  constitutionally  recognized  and protected  in-
terests  to  which  the  foregoing  formulations  apply,  irrespective  of
whether the alleged violator is  a public official  or a private agent.  Ac-
cording to Rodriguez, -the "importance of a service  ...does not deter-
mine whether it must be regarded as fundamental" and "social importance
is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scru-
tiny."  Rather, "the answer lies in assessing whether [the claimed right is]
. ..  expressly or implicitly guaranteed  by the Constitution."' 5   Yet ex-
press  mention  of the  interest  or right  is  not  required.  "The  constitu-
tional  underpinnings  of  the  right  to  equal  treatment  in  the  voting
process  can no longer be doubted even though.  . . 'the  right  to  vote
in  state  elections  is  nowhere  expressly  mentioned.'  "16  Nor,  as  has
often  been  noted,  is  "privacy"  or  "association"  expressly  mentioned;
yet it has  evidently been  the special values  that these  two words  evoke
for the  Court which have prompted  holdings that private choice  about
certain  matters is constitutionally  protected  against governmental  usur-
pation.1
7
13.  See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. CL  791  (1974).
14.  See San Antonio  Independent School  Dist. v. Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1, 20  (1973)
(dictum).  As  to whether  the  exclusionary-fee  rule truly  is  a  corollary  of  the  conven-
ience-and-efficiency  rule, see text accompanying  notes 107-12,  infra.
15.  Id. at  30,  32,  33-34.  In  the  context  of  the  Rodriguez  discussion,  the  word
"service"  can  fairly  be  taken  as  including  such  varied  benefits  as  legal  representation,
education, access to the vote, freedom to marry, procreate, or travel.
16.  Id. at 34  n.74, quoting Harper  v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,  383  U.S. 663,
665 (1966).
17.  The  matters  include  procreation, Skinner  v.  Oklahoma,  316  U.S.  535  (1942),
as interpreted  in United  States v. Kras,  409  U.S.  434, 444  (1973),  and in  San  Antonio
Independent  School  Dist.  v.  Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1, 4  n.76  (1973);  abortion, Roe  v,
Wade,  410 U.S.  113  (1973);  marriage,  Loving  v. Virginia,  388  U.S.  1 (1967),  as inter-
preted  in  Boddie  v.  Connecticut,  401  U.S.  371,  376  (1971),  and  in  United  States  v,
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It will  be a part of my task to show  that due process,  in its nar-
rowest,  most  distinctive,  and  most  conventional  ("procedural")  sense
of  a  defensive  right  to be  heard,  is  no  less  expressive  of  or  instinct
with an unmentioned plaintiff's right to a fair hearing than is the equal
protection clause  with its unmentioned right "to participate in elections
[or in  the voting process]  on. an  equal basis  with  other  citizens  in the
jurisdiction,"'18  or  are  the  first,  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  amendments
with their unmentioned right of family privacy.'9
There  may  be  another  possiblity.  Some fundamental  rights  may
be  inferred  not from  the  text  of  the  Constitution  but from  its  meta-
text-from  the  complex  of understandings  which  seemingly  must  un-
derlie  the whole  governmental  system therein  established.20  Most no-
Kras,  409  U.S.  at 444;  divorce, Boddie  v.  Connecticut,  401  U.S.  371  (1971),  as inter-
preted  in  United States  v. Kras,  409  U.S. at 440-46,  449-50;  receipt and possession of
information, Stanley v. Georgia,  394  U.S.  557  (1969);  and child rearing, Meyer v. Ne-
braska,  262 U.S. 390  (1923),  as interpreted  in Boddie v.  Connecticut,  401  U.S.  at 376,
and in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. at 444.
18.  San  Antonio  Independent  School  Dist.  v.  Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1,  34  n.74
(1973),  citing Dunn  v.  Blumstein,  405  U.S.  330  (1972);  Bullock v. Carter,  405  U.S.
134  (1972);  Oregon  v. Mitchell,  400 U.S.  112  (1970);  Kramer v. Union  Free  School
Dist., 395 U.S.  621  (1969);  Williams v. Rhodes,  393 U.S.  23  (1968);  Reynolds  v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533  (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368  (1963).
19.  See San Antonio  Independent  School  Dist. v. Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1, 34 nn.73,
76  (1973);  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20.  Cf.  Bork,  Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment  Problems, 47  IND.
L.J.  1,  17-19  (1971);  Winter,  Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1972 Sup.  Cr. R V.  41,  60.
Mr. Bork  (whom Professor Winter follows)  speaks  of  "deriv[ing]  rights from  gov-
ernmental  processes  established  by  the  Constitution,"  a  course  of  reasoning  which  he
distinguishes  from that  of "tak[ing]  from the  document  rather  specific values  that  text
or history  show the  framers  actually to have  intended ...  ."  Bork, supra at  17.  An-
other  distinction  apparently  embraced  by  Mr. Bork  is  that  between  rights  which  are
"possessed  by  the  individual  because  the  Constitution  has made  a value  choice  about
individuals"  (call  these  "intrinsic"  rights)  and  rights which  are  "located  in  the  individ-
ual  for the  sake  of a governmental  process  that the  Constitution  outlines  . . . because
his enjoyment  of  them will lead  him to  defend them in  court  and thereby  preserve  the
governmental  process  from  legislative  or  executive  deformation"  (call  these  "instru-
mental"  rights).  Id.  Mr. Bork  seems  to  say  (but  without  offering  any  explanation
for  this  view)  that all  the "derived"  (what I have  called "metatextual")  rights  are  of
the  instrumental  sort.  Adopting  the  Bork  categories,  one  might  be  attracted  by  the
thought  that there is  an instrumental  ground  for "deriving!'  constitutional protection  of
the litigation  rights of  those who contend against the government (and  especially  crim-
inal  defendants?),  since  the  exercise  of such  rights  seems  calculated  to  "preserve  the
governmental  process  from  . . . deformation;"  and  through  such  thinking  one  could
perhaps  avoid  a parallel  inference  of  constitutional protection  for civil litigation  rights.
But why must or should  the inference  of rights from  the whole constitutional  plan be
limited  to  those  which  fit  the  instrumentalist,  countervailing-power  perspective?  Why
may not the whole constitutional  plan with equal  force  imply  a recognition  of intrinsic
rights?  Why  may  it not  project  an  ideal  conception  of  human  good  or  need--or  of
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tably, the  right  "to  participate  in  elections  [or  in the  voting  process]
on  an  equal  basis  with  other  citizens  in the jurisdiction,"  though  the
Court  has  ascribed  it to  the  equal  protection  clause,  may  also  spring
from metatextual  sources;  and  I  shall  argue  in the next  section  that,
insofar  as it does, so does a right of  equal juridical participation.
A.  ESTABLISHING "PROTECTED"  STATUS  FOR THE
COURT-ACCESS  RIGHT
1.  The Metatextual  Argument:  Voting and  Litigating  Compared
There  are  a number  of  striking  resemblances  between  the  inter-
ests in voting and in litigating.21  Some of these resemblances  could be
called  rhetorical,  consisting  as  they  do  of  statements  loosely  descrip-
tive  of  both  voting  and  litigating,  which  are  not  susceptible  of  any-
thing  approaching  rigorous  demonstration.  Both  the  voting  and
litigating  interests  base  a  claim  to  "fundamentality"  on  the  idea
that they  are  "preservative  of  all rights";22  of both it can  be  said that
"in social compact terms,  in exchange for this legal  and orderly method
of resolving  disputes,  one  restricts  his  power  to  satisfy  his  claims  by
force. '2 3  It is said that "ability  to litigate just  claims,  like  availability
of the franchise, gives  legitimacy to the state's  coercive power." 24   The
second Justice Harlan shared these perceptions:
Perhaps  no  characteristic  of  an  organized  and  cohesive  society  is
more  fundamental  -than its  erection  and  enforcement  of  a  system  of
rules  defining  the  various  rights  and  duties  of  its  members,  enabling
them  to  govern  their  affairs  and  definitively  settle  their  differences  in
an orderly,  predictable  manner.  Without  such  a  "legal  system,"  social
organization  and  cohesion  are  virtually  impossible;  with  the  ability  to
seek regularized  resolution of  conflicts  individuals  are  capable  of  inter-
dependent  action  that  enables  them  to  strive for  achievements  without
the anxieties  that would beset them in a disorganized  society.  Put more
succinctly,  it  is this  injection  of the rule  of  law  that  allows  society to
reap  the benefits  of  rejecting  what political  theorists  call  "the  state  of
nature."
American  society,  of  course,  bottoms  its  systematic  definition  of
individual  rights  and  duties,  as  well  as  its  machinery  for dispute  settle-
role,  or citizenship,  or  social  relations-which  compels  the  recognition  of  some  right,
say a right of civil litigation, for noninstrumentalist, nonutilitarian reasons?
21.  See Wille, supra note 9,  at 19.
22.  Harper  v.  Virginia State  Bd.  of Elections,  383  U.S.  663,  667  (1966),  quoting
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,  118 U.S. 356, 370  (1886).
23.  Goodpaster,  The  Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and
the Indigent's Right of Free Access  to the  Courts, 56  IowA  L. Rnv.  223,  251  (1970).
24.  The Supreme Court,  1970 Term, 85 HAXv. L. R  v. 104, 109-10  (1971).
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ment, not on custom  or  the will of  strategically  placed individuals,  but
on the common-law  model.  It is  to  courts,  or  other  quasi-judicial  of-
ficial bodies,  that we ultimately look for the implementation  of  a regu-
larized,  orderly  process  of  dispute settlement.  Within  this  framework
those who wrote our original Constitution,  in the Fifth Amendment,  and
later those who  drafted  the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the cen-
trality  of the  concept  of  due  process  in  the  operation  of  this  system.
Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of his rights, neither
liberty nor property,  without due  process  of law,  the  State's  monopoly
over  techniques  for binding  conflict resolution  could hardly  be  said  to
be  acceptable  under  our scheme  of things.  Only  by providing  that the
social  enforcement  mechanism  must  function  strictly  within  these
bounds  can  we  hope  to maintain  an ordered  society that is also  just.25
Justice  Harlan's  eloquence  may  help  put  us  in  a  frame  of  mind
receptive  to  the  analytical  resemblances  between  the  voting  and  liti-
gating interests.
One  has  to  begin  by  frankly  recognizing  that  on  any  particular
occasion,  perhaps  on  most occasions  on which  one  is  entitled  to  vote
or litigate  if  one  so  chooses,  the  one  so  entitled  may  have  little  or
nothing  of  importance  immediately  at stake.  He may not much  care,
or have  any great reason  for caring,  who wins the election  or whether
the  referendum  question  is  voted up  or  down.  Similarly,  though  he
may have  a winning  cause of action,  he may not be greatly concerned,
or  have  any  reason  for  being  greatly  concerned,  about  receiving  the
remedy to  which  he  is  entitled.  In either  case,  if  forced  to pay  the
full marginal  cost of  exercising  the  participatory right,  a person  might
well choose  to forego it.  In fact,  this often happens  in both modes  of
participation.  People stay  away from the  polls in  droves,  especially in
bad  weather,  evidently  because  they  have  too  little  immediately  at
stake  to warrant  the inconvenience  of going out to vote.  People like-
wise often  forbear  to  sue even when  their  probabilities of winning  are
near  unity,  because  victory  is  not  worth  the  expense  (including  per-
sonal inconvenience).  Both as to voting  and as  to litigating, there  are
respectable  reasons for believing  that these  economic-deterrence  effects
are often salutary.2 8
25.  Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-75  (1971).
26.  As  for  litigating,  see  note  85  infra and  accompanying  text.  As  for  voting,
there  is  an  argument  that  any  device  which  causes  the probability  of  one's  casting  a
vote  to  vary with  the intensity  of  one's  concern  about  the  issues  or  candidates,  tends
to increase  the election's  net  output of  aggregate  voter satisfaction.  Cf. Harper  v. Vir-
ginia  State  Bd.  of  Elections,  383  U.S.  663,  684-85  (1966)  (Harlan,  J.,  dissenting).
This  argument may be vulnerable to the charge  of overlooking the noninstrumental  sig-
nificance  of voting-as,  for  example,  a  symbolic  reaffirmation  of  membership  in  the
community-but it is, even so, both a plausible and respectable  view.
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Yet the general anticipation of one's being free  to participate (vote
or litigate)  when one wants  or needs  to  do so  seems  tremendously  sig-
nificant,  wholly apart from whether  such a want or need  ever  actually
materializes  and motivates  a person to vote or  sue.  This  anticipation
matters  both  on  account  of  its  deterrent  effects  on  the  behavior  of
those  who  must contemplate  being  voted  on  or sued,  and  on account
of its  effects  on the  potential  participant's  own  understanding  of  so-
ciety and of his  or her place in it.  As to voting, the point hardly re-
quires  elaboration.  The low voter turnouts which regularly bring cries
of consternation  and exclamations of fear for the health of "our demo-
cratic  system"  plainly  must reflect  (at  least in  part)  the  effectiveness
of people's potential vote.  If politicians'  anticipation  that  people  will
vote when they feel the need causes the politicians  to act in such  a way
as to  minimize  people's  feelings  of needing  to vote,  then  in  many  in-
stances people will not vote because,  as it turns out, they don't need to.
In  this  light,  a person's  failure  to  vote, or  his  readiness  to  admit  on
the occasion of any particular election  that he doesn't  much care  if he
votes today or not, is no evidence  at all that his right  to vote  in gener-
al is not important to him.  Quite possibly he has  been participating-
making his  will count-all along by letting it be  supposed  that he  will
vote if pushed to it.
Cannot  much  the  same  thing  be  said  of  one's  right  to  litigate
in general?  We  are, it may be said,  a juridical society.  I say a juridical
society, not  a fractious  or litigious  one  (though by some lights  the lat-
ter  adjectives,  too,  may  be  thought  applicable).  To  a notable  degree
the panorama  of  our public life  and human  interaction  occurs  against
a  backdrop  of  supposed,  even  if  vaguely  comprehended,  legal  rights,
entitlements,  and  protections-all  potentially  realizable  through  liti-
gation, but all meaningful  also  simply by virtue of their inchoate  public
recognition,  quite  apart  from  whatever  explicit  litigation  threat  may
develop.  This jural backdrop  must  surely  exert  a  deep  and  pervasive
influence not  only on our  dealings  with  one  another  but on  our very
attitudes  towards  one another.  7  Some  dim  awareness  that courts  are
available  as  a  last  resort  to  protect  one's  entitlements,  including,  to
some  extent,  one's claims  to fair and just treatment, must certainly,  in
our society  in its present  stage  of evolution,  make  a  significant  contri-
bution to whatever  sense of  security  people feel  in  entering  into rela-
tionships  with  others-relationships  often  involving  personal  exposure
or dependency  of one sort or  another.  This  means  that for the  excep-
tional person for whom the courts  promise or turn out to  be effectively
27.  See Abram, Access to the Judicial  Process,  6 GA. L. Rnv. 247  (1972).
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inaccessible,  the  sense  of security-and  with  it  self-respect-may  be
significantly  undetermined.  On the  other hand,  suspicion  that  certain
others  cannot  count  upon  effective  juridical  access  can  hardly  help
biasing the shape of transactions,  relationships,  and  attitudes  that  arise
between  oneself  and those  others.  And what  of the  influence  of  the
jural backdrop on legislative  activity?  Who doubts that the  legislature,
when  it considers  what  general  rules  or  entitlements  should prevail  in
some sector  of human  affairs,  -tends to  proceed on the comforting  as-
sumption that the  courts,  fully  armed  not  only  with  whatever  rule  or
entitlement  the legislature may promulgate  but  also with the  traditions
and principles of common law and equity, are there if needed to prevent
unanticipated  injustice?  Insofar  as  that  assumption  is untrue for  any
person,  is that person not being exploited -by  the legislative  process?  In-
deed,  do not  all these considerations fairly add up to a conclusion that
any  person  who  cannot  rest  assured  that in  situations  of legal  stress
he or she will have effective access to the juridical  system is to that ex-
tent  excluded  from the  circle  of  citizens,  much  as  a person  would  be
excluded by denial of the franchise?28
To be  effective,  anticipation must be  credible.  If a right to par-
ticipate  in general is vitally important  because  of what results  from the
general  anticipation  of it,  then  there  is need  for  caution  about  refus-
ing to honor  the right on particular occasions  of its attempted  exercise
because  the costs of that particular  exercise  don't seem to be worth the
immediate  stakes.  This  is  obvious  to  all in the  case  of voting,  and  it
seems  no  less  true  in  the  case  of  litigating.  Moreover,  as  to  both
voting  and litigating it can  be  argued  that  the risk  of being  excluded
on a particular  occasion by functional  indigency-inability to pay even
a  scaled-down  fee  in  a  partially  subsidized  system-is  a risk  that may
not  fairly be imposed.  Insofar  as the  anticipatory  importance  of par-
ticipation  pertains  to  deterrence,  the  argument  would  have to  be  that
an  entire,  distinguishable  interest group  (people with  little  wealth  and
low  incomes)  will  thus  be  excluded  with  resulting skewing  of the in-
centive system  away from the degree of concern  for their interests  that
is  due  them.  And  insofar  as  the  anticipatory  importance  of  partici-
pation  lies in  its  meaning  for  the  self-image  of  the  potential  partici-
pant,  the argument  is  that  the impecunious  person, having  to  contem-
28.  See  Abram,  supra note  27,  at  251:  "[T]he  question  whether  access  to
the courts  will be facilitated by  removal of financial  barriers  . . . is important to poten-
tial  litigants  because  it  tells  them  whether  they  will  have  equal  access  to  this  'more
rational'  source  of power.  It  tells  them,  in  short,  whether  the  society  in  which  they
live  will allow  them to enjoy this fundamental  component  of civilization.  It tells  them
whether they will be fully enfranchised  citizens."
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plate  not just  one but  an  indefinite  series  of exclusions,  would  suffer
just the injuries which  his participatory right is  supposed to avoid.
However  persuasive  one  may  find  these  arguments,  they  seem
about as  persuasive  when applied to litigation as  when applied  to vot-
ing.  And that is enough  to establish  the  analogy between  voting  and
litigating  required  for the  constitutional-law  argument  I  am  trying to
build-that  insofar  as  metatextual  considerations  argue  for  consecra-
tion of general voting rights in a special status of constitutional protec-
tion  against  frustration  by  access  fees, 2 9  such  considerations  argue  as
strongly for a like conclusion :about general litigation  rights.  For this
purpose,  it  matters  not  whether  the  special  constitutional  status  is
called  a part  of  "due  process  liberty"  or  of  the  "substantive"  aspect
of equal protection of the laws.
It  should  be  clear  that  my  argument  comparing  access  to  the
courts  through litigation  with  access  to  the  legislatures  through  voting
does  not  rest  on  the  theory  that  judicial  decisions  are  "really"  just
legislation  from  another  source;  nor  is  the  argument's  reach  limited
to  "law  reform"  cases  in  which  the  differences  between  adjudica-
tion  and  legislation  are  least  distinct.  The  argument  treats  litiga-
tion  and  legislation  as  distinct  processes,  but  as  bound  up  with  one
another  in  an  entire,  political-legal  order  in  which  the  court's  part
is no less  critical  than the legislature's-and  no  less  critical where  the
rights  for  which  vindication  is  sought  are  of  the  plainest,  best-estab-
lished  sort than  where  they  arexof  phenomenal  social  significance  or
are still straining for judicial recognition.  The Supreme  Court has sig-
nified  its  agreement  through  its  decisions  treating  voluntary  associa-
tion  for  litigation  purposes  as  an  exercise  of first  amendment  rights:
That view holds whether  the  aim of the litigation  be the  overthrow  of
Jim Crow3" or the recovery of damages for personal injury.3 1
It  would,  conversely,  be  a  mistake  to  think  that  constitutional
protection for court access  is limited to  cases  in which persons  seek ju-
dicial  effectuation  of  established  or  conceded  rights under  existing  le-
gal interpretations,  and  does  not extend  to  quests  for  "law  reform."32
29.  See  Harper  v.  Virginia  State  Bd.  of  Elections,  383  U.S.  663,  667-68  (1966);
cf.  Lubin  v.  Panish,  94  S.  Ct.  1315  (1974);  Bullock  v.  Carter,  405  U.S.  134  (1972).
30.  See  NAACP  v. Button, 371 U.S. 415  (1963).
31.  See  UMW, Dist.  12 v. Illinois  State  Bar Ass'n,  389  U.S.  217  (1967);  Brother-
hood  of  R.R.  Trainmen  v.  Virginia  ex  rel. Virginia  State  Bar,  377  U.S.  1  (1964);
Brickman,  Of  Arterial Passageways Through  the  Legal  Process:  The  Right  of  Uni-
versal Access  to  Courts and Lawyering Services, 48  N.Y.U.L.  REv.  595  (1973);  cf.
Willging,  Financial  Barriers and the  Access of Indigents to  the  Courts, 57  Guo.  L.J.
253, 282-83  (1968).
32.  See  generally Hazard,  Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36  U.  Cm.  L.  Rnv.
699  (1969).
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Judicial  decisions  that might loosely be classed  as  "law reform"  are of
course not that in strict formalistic theory,83 but rather are the vindica-
tion of positively  established rights.  If, for example,  a  suit is  success-
fully brought to correct the diversion  of certain  grant-in-aid funds from
congressionally  specified beneficiary  groups,34 the effect  on administra-
tive practice may resemble that of  a  change in law; administrators,  re-
quired  for  the  first time  to  obey  the  law,  and  to conform  their  own
regulations  to it, may feel  as  though the law has been "changed";  but
they are simply mistaken in that feeling.
Obviously this point can be  escalated one step,  to the level where
statutory  law  is  tested  against  the  Constitution.  In  what  sense  is it
correct  to  say,  for  example,  that the  decision  in  Boddie v.  Connecti-
cut3 " is "law reform" rather than simply the securing to Mrs. Boddie and
her  "classmates"  of their  established  rights under the existing Supreme
Law of the land?  Some would answer that, in applying the broad man-
dates  of  the  fourteenth  amendment  and  other  constitutional  abstrac-
tions,  the  Supreme  Court  and  other  courts  are  in reality  making  and
changing-not  simply  applying-the  law.  The metatextual  argument,
if  accepted,  excuses  us  from  resolving  the  theoretical  controversy  to
which  that answer leads.  For however we wish to characterize the way
our courts  behave  in constitutional  cases, that is how they do behave.
That judicial  behavior,  whatever  it is  and  whatever  we  call  it, is  ac-
cessible  to  a substantial portion  of the citizenry-those  able  to afford
the costs.  That judicial behavior is part and parcel of our political sys-
tem  as it is found  from time  to  time.  Whether that behavior  is  con-
tained  wholly within the juridical  sector or spills  over  into the legisla-
tive  sector matters not for  the force  of the  proposition that, whatever
the  political  system-the  governmental  system-is  at  a  given  mo-
ment,  all citizens  by virtue of their  citizenship have a "fundamental  in-
terest" in access to it.
We are a juridical society.  We are also,  to some unutterable  ex-
tent,  a judge-governed  society.  Access to courts  and access to legisla-
tures  are claims that merge into  one another,  to just that same unutter-
able extent.  Law reform  and law application  are, to  that same extent,
but  different  perspectives  on one  governmental  process.  You cannot,
without  confusion,  call  a  person a citizen  and  at the same  time sanc-
33.  Le.,  the  theory  according  to which  courts,  as  such,  have  no  proper  function
save  to apply the established, general  rules of positive law  to the specific fact  situations
before them.  See Kennedy, supra  note 7, at 358-59.
34.  E.g.,  Natonabah  v.  Gallup-McKinely  County  Bd.  of  Educ.,  355  F.  Supp.  716
(D.N.M.  1973).
35.  401U.S. 371  (1971).
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tion the exclusion of that person from that process.m
2.  Protection  For  Court  Access Inferred
From Procedural  Due Process
In  this  section  I  shall  not  argue  that litigation  access  for  civil
plaintiffs  is  directly  encompassed  within  the  established  strict  right  of
defensive  procedural  due  process  which  furnished  the  Court's  basic
premise in Boddie and countless  other cases . 7  It  is  tempting to see in
every  violation  of  a legal  right,  whether  by  private  agents  or  public
officials,  a  "deprivation"  of property or liberty which becomes  a viola-
tion  of the  constitutional  due process  guaranty  when  the state  fails  to
provide  a  genuine  opportunity  to  seek  requital  in the  courts; 8  how-
ever,  this  approach is not wholly satisfactory.  It  undeniably  lays some
strain on the constitutional text:  To say "[n]o state shall deprive any per-
son of liberty or property"  is not quite to say  "[e]ach state shall  effec-
tively vindicate  all claims  arising out  of  deprivations  by anyone of lib-
erty  or  property."  If,  as  has been  suggested,  the  requisite  "state  ac-
tion" - the state's  authorship of a deprivation-is  to be located in the
legal  rules  forbidding  self-help, 9  the  resulting  protection  against  ex-
clusion from court by access  fees  will not apply in any  case where  we
can  conjure  up some  lawful self-help  method that might have  worked,
be it ever so imprudent or impractical.40  If, as has also been suggested,
36.  "Both voting and access  to the courts  are forms  of enfranchisement,  of partici-
pation  in  the political  process."  Abram,  supra note  27,  at  259.  A like  point  is made
in Wille, supra  note 9, at 5.
37.  Many  are cited in Boddie, 401  U.S. at 377-78  n.3.  A notable post-Boddie deci-
sion  is Fuentes  v.  Shevin,  407  U.S.  67  (1972).  See  also Mitchell  v.  W.T.  Grant Co.,
94 S. Ct. 1895  (1974).
38.  See  Willging, supra note 31, at 287-88.
39.  See  Goodpaster,  supra note 23,  at 251-52.
40.  See  Part I  at  1195-96  & n.146.  Of  course,  as  the Kras opinion  reminds  us,
see id. at  1159-60,  there  is available  in virtually  every  case  (divorce  is  the chief  excep-
tion)  at least  one  lawful,  practicable,  and prudent  (if erratically  effective)  method  of
self-help,  namely,  appeal  to the  conscience  and  good will of your  adversary.  Professor
Goodpaster, supra note  23,  foreseeing  this  rejoinder,  stipulates  that  due  process  rights
are violated  by  legal  rules  "which  require  an  individual  to  resort to a  court  for  the
protection  of  an  interest  or  claim  or to  go  begging."  Id. at  251  (emphasis  added).
But the  question remains:  Since the state  did not itself  commit  the injurious  act,  and
since  it  doesn't  prevent  the  victim  from  presenting  his  claim  of right  to  the  injurer,
how can  it be said  that the state  has committed  a  deprivation?  And  what if the state
hasn't  forbidden  all  other imaginable  forms  of self-help?  What if the victim  was  le-
gally privileged  but physically  unable to withstand the finance  company  man's reposses-
sion  of  his  car?  Or  could  have  avoided  repossession  by  keeping  the car  holed up  in
a garage?  At bottom, the trouble  with  locating the requisite state  action  in rules  for-
bidding self-help  is that only sometimes-perhaps  rarely-are  those  rules really relevant
to  the victim's predicament.  Often  or usually the reason he  needs  access  to the  courtsLITIGATION  ACCESS  FEES
the state  action is  to be located in the private injurer's  having commit-
ted  the  injury  while  acting  in  a statelike  role  or performing  a  "state
function," 41  the  resulting  protection  against  exclusion  from  court  by
access fees  will apparently apply only to cases in which the injurer was
bent upon some remedial self-help project of his own."2
But  the  act  of  barring  access  to  the  courts,  by  demanding  fees
from  persons  unable  to  pay  them,  unquestionably  belongs  to  the
state;43 and it is that sort of state action which,  I argue, unconstitution-
ally  restricts  enjoyment  of  a constitutionally  recognized  liberty  of liti-
gation  access.  There  is no  need  to look  any  further for  state  action
(although,  as  will  be  seen,  the  "state  action"  qualification  on  four-
teenth  amendment  guaranties  remains  a  problem  for  the  argument).
Nor is  there  any need  to  insist that the protected  liberty, of which  the
state  deprives  a functionally  indigent person by  demanding  the  fee,  is
the  same  thing  as-or  is  quite  contained  within-the  established,  de-
fensive  procedural  due  process  right of  notice  and  opportunity  to be
heard.  It will  be  enough to  show  that the  substantive right of access
is so  closely related to the strict right  of defense, is so clearly  suggested
by  the  evident  purpose  of  the  strict  defensive  right,  as  to  partake  of
constitutional  protection  through  the  "fundamental  interest"  concep-
tion given its most recent formulation in Rodriguez.4
a.  The Currently Established  Broad  Meaning of
Defensive Procedural  Due Process
We  can  divide  the  disputable  elements  in a  civil  action into the
three  categories  of injury, justification,  and  cause.  Let us  define "jus-
is  not that  the state is forbidding him  to use some  alternative,  self-help  recourse  which
would serve him just as well; but rather that there  is not and  never  has been any alter-
native  recourse,  which  as  a matter of fact would  have  been  effective,  practicable, 'pru-
dent,  and  reasonable  to  expect  him  to  take.  (Insofar  as that  is  not  true,  there  may
well  be a  substantive  defense  to his claim,  on  the order of contributory  negligence,  as-
sumption  of  the  risk,  "coming  to  the  nuisance,"  failure  to  mitigate  damages,  or some
other manifestation of the "rule of avoidable consequences.")
41.  See Clark & Landers, Sniadach,  Fuentes  and Beyond:  The Creditor Meets  the
Constitution,  59 VA. L. Rnv. 355,  377-79  (1973).
42.  The statement  in  the  text is  amplified  in  the  Appendix,  see text  accompanying
notes  118-19  infra.  Various  other theories  of "state  action"  in  the context  of self-help
repossession  by secured  creditors  are advanced by  Clark & Landers,  supra note 41.  See
also  McDonnell,  Sniadach,  The  Replevin  Cases,  and  Self-Help  Repossession-Due
Process Tokenism?,  14  B.C.  IND.  & COM.  L. Rnv.  437  (1973).  Opposing  arguments
are  marshalled  in  Burke  & Reber,  State Action,  Congressional Power and  Creditors'
Rights:  An  Essay on  the Fourteenth Amendment,  46  S.  CAL.  L. REv.  1003  (Parts  I
&l1); 47 S.  CAL. L. RPv. 1 (1973)  (Part II).
43.  See Goodpaster, supra note 23, at 251; cf. Comment, supra note 8, at 588.
44.  See notes  14-20 supra and accompanying text.
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tification"  to  mean  an  objectively  verifiable  explanation  or  account
of  a person's  conduct  or  the  circumstances  attending  it, where  under
an applicable  rule  of law some  explanation  of that sort would  absolve
that conduct of legally wrongful  quality despite its having  caused harm
to  another.  Examples  of  justifications  are:  "My conduct  was  con-
sistent  with my promises";  "my  conduct  was  consistent  with  all  perti-
nent  regulatory  laws";  "my  conduct  was  reasonable  under  the  cir-
cumstances."
Now let us say that a person, P, sustains  a "legally cognizable in-
jury"  whenever  the  conduct  of  another  person,  D,  causes  an  unwel-
come  impact  upon  P, and  under  the  applicable  legal  rules  D  who
causes  such  an  impact by  such conduct  becomes  subject to  a demand
by P for  justification;  which  is  to  say  that  D  is  not legally  free,  at
least without  compensating  P for  his losses,  to  cause  such  an impact
by  such  conduct  at  his  completely  unrestricted  discretion. 45   A  term
closely  related  to  legally  cognizable  injury  is  "entitlement,"  where  en-
titlement  refers  to  any  treatment  which  the  applicable  law  says P is
(or is not) to receive  from D  unless a justification  exists.  An entitle-
ment  is  treatment  which  D  may not  lawfully  withhold  from  (or  im-
pose upon) P at D's completely  unrestricted  discretion.  Legally  cog-
nizable injury, then, is the exact equivalent of denial  or violation  of an
entitlement.
4 6
Finally,  let us  use  the phrase  "cause'  or  "legal cause"  to  signify
that sort of factual,  causal connection  between  P's harm  and D's con-
duct  which  will  render  D legally  liable  for the  harm  if it is  a legally
cognizable  injury and D's conduct is not justified.  To illustrate:  A
45.  I intend  no  implication  that D  will  always,  or usually,  be assigned  burdens of
proof on justification  issues.
It should  be  noted  that  my definitions  confine  the  justification  category  to  ques-
tions about whether D's conduct violated a legal norm-leaving  to the  legal  injury cate-
gory  questions  about  whether  P's injury  was  "within  the  risk"  contemplated  by  any
norm  which  D's  conduct  did  violate  or whether  the  violated  norm  defined  a  "duty"
which  D  owed to P.  This sort  of  question  is not easily  assigned  to  one  or the  other
category.  It might  well  be  thought a  part of justification  for D  to  contend  that  the
legal order  does  not mean to include  liability for  a given  sort of injury to a given  sort
of  P  (or  liability  to  injunctions  at  the  behest  of  such  P's  sustaining  such  injuries)
among  the  sanctions  faced  by  agents  who  must  shape  their  conduct  in  contemplation
of legal norms.  My  reason for  assigning the  "risk" or "duty"  question  to the category
of injury rather than justification is a rhetorical  one explained in note 52 infra.
46.  Entitlements  thus are not "absolute"  claims  which override  all possible justifica-
tions,  but rather  claims  triggering demands  for some  sort of justification.  This usage,
which  may strike some readers  as  artificial,  is adopted  because  it corresponds with the
Supreme  Court's usage  in  conceptualizing  procedural  due  process  rights.  See  note  52
infra and accompanying text.
47.  These  are  all,  to  be  sure,  question-begging  definitions.  But the questions  they
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person  suffering  bodily  harm  from  the  conduct  of  another  has  un-
doubtedly  sustained  a legally  cognizable  injury,  although  on many oc-
casions  justification  will be rather  easy  (e.g.,  the  harm  was  unintended
and the conduct prudent).  A person gazed  at on the street,  or refused
private  charity,  has  certainly  not sustained  a legally  cognizable  injury.
A  person  denied  public  employment  has  sustained  no  such  injury  by
virtue  of  the  refusal  simpliciter. 48   Yet  one  may  have  a legally  pro-
tected  claim  not  to  be  denied  public  employment  in  violation  of  a
special  contract,  express  or  implied,40  or  in violation  of legally  estab-
lished  procedures; 5 0  one  may  also  have  legally  protected  claims  not
to be denied  employment for  certain  illicit reasons-for  example,  that
one is of Ukrainian extraction or is a subscriber to American Opinion."
In these  latter  cases,  it  seems  less  apt to  describe  the legal  injury  as
denial  of  employment  than  as  discrinination,  punishment  of  speech
and  association,  or  violation  of  reliance  upon,  and  expectations  re-
garding, promises and procedural regularity.
Our  definitions  can  now  be  used  to  state  what  seems  to  be  the
currently  accepted  meaning  of  defensive  procedural  due  process:
whenever state officials by their conduct cause a legally cognizable injury
to any person--or,  in  other words,  violate  any  of  that person's  entitle-
ments-that person may demand that the officials  submit the question of
justification  to binding appraisal by an impartial officer in a proceeding
in which the injured person has had  a fair opportunity to  participate.52
beg-those regarding  the actual  or ideal  content of  the legal  rules-do not immediately
concern us.
Again,  I  can  see  no  clear  reason  of  principle  why  "risk"/"duty"  questions  might
not be  assigned  to the  legal  cause category  just as  well  as to the  injury category.  See
generally  R.  KEETON,  LEGAL  CAUSE  IN  THE  LAW  OF  TORTS  (1963).  The  choice  is
strictly  a matter of expository convenience.  It has no  critical  bearing  on the argument
I am making.
48.  See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
49.  See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593  (1972).
50.  Cf. Albert,  Standing to  Challenge Administrative Action:  An  Inadequate Sur-
rogate for Claims for Relief, 83  YALE L.J. 425,  463  (1974).
51.  See Arnett v.  Kennedy, 92  S.  Ct. 1633  (1974);  Perry v. Sindermann,  408  U.S.
593, 597-98  (1972);  Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391  U.S. 563  (1968).
52.  See  Perry v. Sindermann,  408  U.S. 593  (1972);  Board of Regents of State  Col-
leges v. Roth,  408  U.S.  564,  569-70  (1972)  (dictum);  Fuentes  v.  Shevin,  407  U.S.  67
(1972).  The theory underlying  these  three  decisions  seems  to  be:  Any  officially  au-
thored deprivation  of liberty or property  triggers  the  defensive  rights of procedural  due
process.  "Liberty"  encompasses  a number of interests  which,  by virtue  of legal  protec-
tion  accorded  by  the  Constitution  itself,  officials  may  not violate  at  their  unfettered
discretion--or,  in other words, without justification.  "Property"  encompasses  any other
interests  ("entitlements")  which,  by virtue of legal protection  accorded  by  statute,  com-
mon law,  or special  contract  sanctioned  by  statute  or common  law,  officials  may  not
violate  at  discretion  and  without  justification.  A majority  of  the Supreme  Court  has
Vol 1974:5271DUKE LAW  JOURNAL
That statement, which may seem  innocent enough  at first acquaintance,
has a number of important and perhaps surprising implications which can
be brought out by considering a series of possible cases.
Case A:  A state  official inflicts  legally  cognizable  injury  at the
behest  of  a private  person,  and  cites  as  justification  a remedial  claim
pertaining  to that  private  person.53   Under  Fuentes v.  Shevin,"  this
triggers defensive procedural due process (DPDP) rights.
recently  confirmed  this  reading  of  the  decisions.  See  Arnett  v.  Kennedy,  92  S.  Ct.
1633,  1670  (1974)  (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting,  joined  by Douglas  and  Brennan,  JJ.);  id.
at  1650  (opinion  of  Powell,  J.,  joined  by  Blackmun,  J.)  ("While  the legislature  may
elect  not to  confer a  property  interest  in  federal  employment,  it may  not  constitution-
ally  authorize  the  deprivation  of  such  an  interest,  once  conferred,  without  [providing
a  constitutionally  required  minimum  of]  appropriate  procedural  safeguards.");  id.  at
1660  (White,  J.,  dissenting)  ("While  the  State  may  define  what  is  and  what  is  not
property,  once having  defined  those  rights  the Constitution  defines  due process,  and  as
I understand it six  members of the Court are in agreement on  this fundamental proposi-
tion.").
It can now  be seen why  I have  chosen  to assign  "risk" or "duty"  questions to  the
injury  rather  than  the  justification  category.  Injury-denial  of  "entitlement"-is  a
threshold  issue in the  procedural  due process  model.  Only upon  its appearing that offi-
cials  have acted  so as  to subject  themselves  to a demand  for justification  can  there  arise
a question  of due process obligations.  Assigning  the "risk" or "duty"  question  to  justi-
fication  would have lowered  the due process  threshold  and  made my restatement  of the
current  doctrine  less  modest  and  more  controversial  than  it  now  is.  But  the  choice
is  merely  rhetorical.  In  the  final  analysis,  it  makes  no  difference.  See  text  accom-
panying notes 64-65 infra.
One might wonder whether "standing"  doctrine  requires qualification  of the  propo-
sition  that  due  process  entails  a  right  on  the  part  of  one  who  has  sustained  a  legally
cognizable  injury  to  demand  justification  from  an official  who  has  legally  caused  that
injury.  But  it  is  strongly  arguable  that  pre-trial  dismissals  explained  on  "standing"
grounds  must  always  rest  either  on  a  judicial  determination  that the  plaintiff  has  sus-
tained  no  legally  cognizable  injury, or else  on  judicial  acceptance  of  some  substantive
justification  advanced  by  the official.  See Albert,  supra note 50, at  425,  427-42,  464-
68, 493-97.
Standing  doctrine  may,  however,  have  a  quite  different  effect  which  should  be
noted:  It may  allow  some  lawsuits to  be  maintained  by  persons  who  have  sustained
no  relevant  legally  cognizable  injury.  See  id. at 468-76.  It seems  that insofar  as  the
argument  against exclusionary  access  fees  rests  on analogy  between  the  proposed  right
of  litigation  access  and  the  established  defensive  right  of  procedural  due  process,  it
would not apply  to  litigation  asserting  only  the  rights of others  or of  the  public.  But
drawing  such  a  line  may  be  exceedingly  impractical.  Compare Part I  at  1211-15.
Moreover,  the  argument based  on  analogy  between  litigation  and  voting,  see  notes  21-
36  supra and  accompanying  text,  seems  to  apply  with full  force  to  "third-party"  and
"public interest" claims.
53.  By  a  "remedial"  claim  or  action  I  mean  one  designed  to  correct  or  resolve
some  inequity  previously  introduced  into  the  relationship  between  agent  and  victim.
Further  development  of  this  analysis  can be  found in  the Appendix,  see  note  117  and
text accompanying notes  117-19 infra.
54.  407  U.S.  67  (1972).  Mitchell  v. W.T. Grant  Co.,  94  S.  Ct.  1895  (1974),  has
not disturbed this part of the Fuentes holding.
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Case B:  The  official acts  on behalf  of  the state itself, claiming a
remedial  justification  pertaining  to  the  state,  and his action  is  an  "af-
firmative"  one  such  as  a seizure  of property,  one which  alters  a status
quo so  as to restore  a (claimed)  previous  equitable  position.  The  ap-
plicability  of DPDP follows a fortiori from Fuentes, inasmuch  as  state
action is even more clearly involved.
Case C:  This resembles  Case B except  that, instead of acting  af-
firmatively,  the  official  withholds  some  demanded  performance,  re-
fusing  to  disturb  an  existing  situation  on  purportedly  remedial
grounds.  Suppose, for example,  that the official refuses  a money pay-
ment assertedly  due  under a contract for services,  on grounds of mate-
rial breach or set-off of damages for breach.  Has the  official violated
DPDP  rights  by failing  to  set up  a fair hearing  prior  to  the  ostensi-
ble  due date?  One  might want  to  avoid  this  question  by noting that
the  citizen's civil  action to  enforce  the contract  fulfills  all the purposes
of  the  DPDP  fair  hearing.55  But  a  knotty  theoretical  problem  re-
mains.  What  if  there has  been no  waiver  of  sovereign  immunity  to
contract  actions,  no Tucker Act56 or  analogous  state legislation?  This
question can be handled in the following  way:  Given  the constitutional
right  of DPDP  as  propounded  in the Fuentes, Roth,  and Sindermann
cases,  either  (i)  allowance  in  such  a case  of a sovereign-immunity  de-
fense  would  have  to be  conceived  as  a matter  of "substantive"  law-
would  have  to  be  a way  of  saying  that enforcement  of  this  promise
by  a state  official  is  not  legally  available  even  though  an  analogous
private promise would have been enforceable  as a matter of general, pri-
vate  law57 -  or  else (ii) if the  defense  is  conceived  as  a  challenge  to
the  court's  competence,  as  distinguished  from  a  denial  of  substantive
liability,  then  allowing  the  defense  will  violate  DPDP  rights  unless
the  official  can  point  to  some  other  forum  in  which  a  judicial  or
55.  That  is,  it fulfills  all  the  purposes  which  can  now  be  achieved  by  a judicial
determination  that  the  failure  to  grant  a  prior  hearing  was  wrongful.  Judicial  relief
now  does  differ from  receipt of  a prior hearing  in that payment  has been  delayed;  but
a judicious award of interest can minimize  that difference.
56.  28 U.S.C.  §§  1346,  1491  (1970).
57.  Such  a  "substantive"  conception  of  official  immunity  seems  to be  reflected  in
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94  S.  Ct.  1638  (1974).  See also The  Western Maid,  257 U.S.  419,
433  (1922)  (Holmes,  J.):  "The  United  States  has  not consented  to be  sued  for torts,
and  therefore  it  cannot be  said  that in  a legal  sense  the United  States has  been  guilty
of a  tort  . . . . Legal  obligations  that  exist  but  cannot  be  enforced  are  ghosts  that
are  seen  in  the law  but  are  elusive  to  the  grasp."  This  "positivist"  view of sovereign
immunity  is discussed  and  questioned in  P.  BAToR,  P. MisuKiN,  D.  SHAPnRo,  H. WEcHs-
LER,  HART  & WECHSLER'S  THE  FEDERAL  CouRTs  AND  THE  FFDERAL  SYSTEM  1343-44
(rev. ed.  1973).
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quasi-judicial  fair hearing  is  available. s  A  substantive  rule withhold-
ing all the sanctions  of contract law  from promises  made by  officials on
the state's behalf would not contradict the DPDP rule that insofar  as  le-
gal  entitlements  do  exist  vis-h-vis  officials  and  the  state,  some  ade-
quate judicial  or  quasi-judicial  tribunal  must be  available  for vindicat-
ing those entitlements.  Under the DPDP rule, the citizen  is entitled to
an  adjudication  of his  claim  in  some  reasonably  accessible  tribunal-
although  that  adjudication  may  go  off  on  a  "substantive"  conclusion
of no liability because of "sovereign immunity."59  A sovereign immunity
defense,  which  totally  excludes  a  fair hearing  on  the  question  of justi-
fication,  once a legally  cognizable  injury  is  asserted,  cannot  be  recon-
ciled with the DPDP rule.  Indeed I shall argue below that it might  be
a  concern  with  just  such  special  claims  of  sovereign  or  official  non-
accountability  which would  explain  why the  constitutional  guaranty  of
58.  The  adequacy  of the  hearing  opportunity  would  always  be  subject  to  judicial
review.  Cf. Comment,  supra note  8,  at 580.  Thus in  cases  such  as  Larson  v. Domes-
tic  & Foreign  Commerce  Corp.,  337  U.S.  682  (1949),  and  Malone  v.  Bowdoin,  369
U.S.  643  (1962),  where  government  officers  successfully  resisted  claims for specific  re-
lief  on  sovereign  immunity  grounds,  it  may  have  been  crucially  important  that  the
plaintiffs had available  to them the alternative  recourse,  under the Tucker  Act,  of suing
for damages  for breach  of  contract  or a  "taking"  of  their  property.  See  id. at  647  &
n.8;  337  U.S.  at 703-04  & n.27;  28  U.S.C.  §§  1346(a),  1491  (1970);  cf.  L. JAFFE,  Ju-
DICIAL CONTROL  OF ADmINISTRATIvE  ACTION 208  (1965):
While  the  Privy  Council  sought  some  of  the  advantages  of  sovereign  im-
munity  in insisting  on separate  [internal]  organs  for  administrative  review,  its
objective  was  not  immunity  [denial  of  hearing]  as  such-remedies  for  griev-
ances  were  still  available-but  escape  from  control  of  another  governmental
body  [the  courts].  If  this was  immunity,  it was  only  such  in  degree,  perhaps
comparable  to  Bacon's  insistence  on  Chancery  as  a  more  suitable  court  for
the King than were the ordinary common  law courts.
But what  do  we  say  when  the  aggrieved  citizen  in  a  case  like Larson or Malone
claims  a  legally  protected  interest  in  regaining  or  retaining  possession  of  the  specific
assets  in  dispute  (relief  not available  under  the  Tucker Act)-perhaps  on  the ground
that  there  is  no  "public  purpose"  to support  a "taking"  of  this  property  by  these  offi-
cers?  From  the Larson opinion  (337  U.S.  at  690),  it appears  that sovereign  immunity
would  not  prevent  adjudication  of  this  claim.  Moreover,  I  cannot  see  why  the  logic
of Fuentes and Sindermann would not augur  success  should  the  citizen 3n  this  case  sue
under 28  U.S.C. §  1331  (1970),  to  restrain the  violation  of  his procedural  due  process
rights  which  occurs  when  government  officers  occupy  his  property  without  allowing
him to be heard  on  the "public purpose"  question.  (I do not, by that statement,  mean
to have  addressed  the immense problem  of what happens  if less than  $10,000  is in  con-
troversy.)
59.  See United  States  v. Lee,  106  U.S.  196,  210,  215-16,  219-20  (1882)  (mere  as-
sertion of  "substantive"  sovereign  immunity  defense  does  not  foreclose  judicial  jurisdic-
tion  to determine  the merits  of  that defense).  If the  defense  claimed  is that  the  gov-
ernment  has provided  another  tribunal  with  exclusive  jurisdiction  to  try  claims  against
the government  or its officers, the court  should  adjudicate  that defense  on  the  merits-
meaning,  particularly,  that the court  should  determine  whether the alternative  tribunal's
formats and procedures meet the standards of procedural  due process.
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DPDP is written in terms limiting the guaranty's  application to depriva-
tions by states.60
Case D:  The  state  official  invokes  a  nonremedial  justification,
while  admitting  that his  action was  a legal  cause of violation of  a  le-
gally protected interest.  For example, the official has destroyed  goods
in  the  citizen's  possession  on  the  ground  -that otherwise  they  would
have  fallen into  the  hands  of  an enemy  power.  Although  a theoreti-
cal argument can be presented which might  limit DPDP rights to con-
texts of remedial justification,"1 it seems most unlikely that a contempo-
rary court or commentator would  seriously try to differentiate  cases  of
remedially  motivated  official  action  from other  cases  of  officially  de-
signed harm to legally protected interests, for DPDP purposes. 62
Case E:  The state official, while admitting that his conduct caused
violation  of a legally protected interest, further says that he has  no jus-
tification  at all-that he has  purported  to make  no judgment  whatso-
ever  about  the  circumstances,  traits,  past  behavior,  or  deserts  of the
adversely  affected citizen,  that therefore  there was no occasion for  any
"fair hearing"  (since  there would have been nothing at issue in such a
hearing)  and  consequently there can have been no violation  of a right
of  DPDP.  The  absurdity  of  the  official's  claim  seems  immediately
apparent,  though  we  may  experience  some  difficulty  in  articulating
why  we  find  it  absurd.  Perhaps  it  is  enough  to  suggest  that  this
case is just the extreme or limiting example  of a case in which the offi-
cial  claims  a  remedial  or  nonremedial  justification  and  the  claimed
justification turns out to fail on the merits.
6 3
Case F:  The  official,  admitting  that his  conduct  caused  legally
cognizable  injury  to  the  citizen,  says  that  the conduct  (if wrongful  at
all)  was  negligent rather  than intentional,  that therefore  there  was no
occasion  for a prior fair hearing,  etc.,  etc.  But the citizen is now de-
manding performance of some remedial obligation-an obligation based
on operation  of law-and why  doesn't the  official's  refusal to  perform
that obligation itself create  an occasion for  a fair hearing?  If the offi-
cial  claims  that his  official status  screens  him  from liability  based  on
his negligence,  we are back to  Case C:  either that is a defense  on the
merits  as  to  which  the  citizen  has  a DPDP right to  an  adjudication,
60.  See  notes  80-81  infra and accompanying  text.
61.  See  Appendix, note  117 and text accompanying notes  117-19 infra.
62.  See  Perry v. Sindermann,  408  U.S.  593  (1972);  Cafeteria  Workers Local  473
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886  (1961).
63.  Compare Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91  (1945).
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or it is a jurisdictional  defense  and as  such  is overcome  by the consti-
tutional guaranty  of DPDP unless a fair hearing is available  elsewhere.
Case G:  The  official  denies  that  he  has  done  anything  which
caused legally  cognizable  injury to the citizen:  by this he means either
that the citizen has in fact sustained no harm; or that any harm which
the citizen has sustained was not "within the risk"  contemplated by any
legal rule restricting the  official's  discretion-i.e.,  that there is no rele-
vant  rule intended  to  protect  that  sort of  citizen  against  that  sort  of
harm;  or  that  his  (the  official's)  conduct  was  not  a  legal  cause  of
harm to the citizen.  For any or  all of these  reasons,  says  the  official,
there  is no  basis for  a  justification  demand  and  so no  occasion  for  a
fair  hearing.  The  discussion  of  Case F  suggests  why,  despite  these
contentions,  the  citizen  is entitled  by  DPDP  to a fair hearing  on  the
issues,  raised by the official,  of  harm in fact, "risk" or  "duty,"  or  le-
gal cause.
The key to the  argument  is that procedural  due process  is  itself
an  entitlement  established  by the  Constitution-a  "master" or  "second
order"  entitlement-an  entitlement  that  officials  shall  submit  to judi-
cial  or quasi-judicial  review of their questioned  conduct.  Like  entitle-
ments  generally,  this  one is  not  an  absolute  claim,  but  it is  a  claim
which may not lawfully be refused  without  justification.  Officials  are
not legally free, at their unrestricted  discretion,  to refuse  review.  The
conduct of refusing review itself causes  a legally cognizable injury, trig-
gering  a demand for justification.  Here justification  includes  such  as-
sertions  as:  The  person  seeking  review  has  suffered  no  harm,  or
no  harm,  against  which  any  relevant  legal  rule  was  meant  to  give
protection,  or no  harm  which  was  legally  caused  by  the  questioned
conduct.  Any  or  all  of  these  justifications  may  be  true,  but  their
truth  is  not  established  by  their  mere  assertion.  Like  justifications
generally,  -their truth is  a mater for  adjudication  or  quasi-adjudication
at the behest of the citizen  asserting  the due process  entitlement.  The
citizen thus  can  be  seen as  pressing his  demand in two stages:  in the
first stage, he  demands  justification for refusal  of a  second-stage hear-
ing  on his  underlying  demand for  justification  of the  specific,  official
conduct  which,  he  says,  caused  a  legally  cognizable  injury  to  him.
If, but only if, it is determined that there is no justification for refusing
the first-stage  demand,  the second-stage hearing ensues.  Of course, be-
cause  the  issues of injury,  risk,  duty,  cause,  and  justification  may  be
closely  intertwined  and  indeed  inseparable,64  the  two  stages  may  in
practice  collapse into  one  proceeding.  For my purposes  the  essential
64.  See  notes 45, 47 supra.
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point is  that a proceeding there must be,  if the  citizen  demands it; and
second-stage  relief must be  forthcoming unless  either  a first-stage  or a
second-stage justification for refusal is established. 65
b.  The Private Civil Action as a (Quasi)
Due Process "Fair  Hearing"
I have  conceded  from the  beginning that the state  does  not com-
mit  a  constitutionally  forbidden  deprivation  when a private  agent un-
justifiably  violates  an entitlement--commits  a tort, breach  of contract,
breach  of trust, or whatever.  But I insist, too, that it can only be this
"state  action"  gap,  and  nothing  else,  which  separates  the  fair-hearing
rights  of  private  civil  plaintiffs  from  those  of persons,  including  civil
defendants  generally,  whose  entitlements  are  violated  or  threatened
with violation by state officials.
The effect  of dispensing with the state  action  qualification  would
be  that violation  by  anyone of  a  legal  entitlement,  coupled  with  de-
nial of a fair-hearing  opportunity, would  also violate the  constitutional
due  process  right;  from  which  it would  follow that  every  civil  action
would  be either  (i) itself  the  "fair  hearing"  constitutionally  owed  to
the  victim,  or  (ii)  judicial  review  of  a  previous,  quasi-judicial  fair
hearing,  or  (iii) barred  by  former  adjudication.  In  short,  every  nisi
prius civil  action,  unless it constitutes  an  attempt to  relitigate  a claim,
is a method of vindicating  quasi-due process rights-due process  rights
which  would prevail  but for the  textual  "state action"  qualification  on
such rights.
Suppose  that  the  "state  action"  qualification  on DPDP rights has
been swept away-so that the clause, in effect, reads:  "No person, shall
deprive  another person  of life, liberty,  or property without  due process
of  law."  Now  imagine  that  a person  suffering  legally  cognizable  in-
jury and wishing to pursue the  claim through litigation, but finding the
ordinary courts for some reason inaccessible,66  adopts the following tac-
tic:  He  initiates  a  "civil rights"  action  (as  I  shall call it)  claiming  an
65.  Readers  may notice a resemblance  between what I have  called first-stage  justifi-
cations--no  harm  in  fact,  no harm  within  the  scope  of  intended  legal  protection,  no
adequate  causal  relationship  between harm  and questioned  conduct-and  the  issues tra-
ditionally  examined  under the  heading  of "standing"  to question  administrative  action.
It has never been  doubted that "standing"  is a question  upon which  the  citizen  seeking
review  is entitled to adjudication;  and the inseparability  of "standing"  issues from "mer-
its"  issues--of  first-order from  second-order  justifications-is  powerfully  demonstrated
by Albert, supra note 50.
66.  The barrier might  be an  access  fee.  Or, imaginably,  it might be  some combi-
nation  of  rules regarding subject-matter  jurisdiction,  venue, and  service  of process  mak-
ing it impossible  to find any tribunal competent to handle a particular case.
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unconstitutional  deprivation  of liberty or property without  due process,
rather than basing  a claim for relief directly on the substantive  law al-
legedly  protecting  his  violated  interest.67  If  the  defendant  cannot
truthfully  deny that  his  conduct  violated  an  entitlement  of the  plain-
tiff  (and  there has  as yet been  no fair hearing  and no  fair hearing  is
available  elsewhere),  the  defendant's  only  course  is  to  admit  the  due
process  violation while denying  any violation of substantive  rights  and
counter-claiming  for relief identical to that to  which he has  already (as
it were)  helped himself.  The  typical result  would  be  adjudication  of
whether  the  defendant's  action  was  legally  justified  under  the  ap-
plicable  substantive  law,  accompanied  by  appropriate  restoration  or
compensation  to the plaintiff if, but only if, the decision on  the merits
goes against the defendant.
Suppose,  for  example,  that  the  plaintiff's  substantive  complaint
against  the  defendant  is  that the  latter has  maintained  an  actionable
nuisance  for  the  preceding  two  months,  causing  both  a  medical  in-
jury to  the plaintiff's  person and  a continuing  impairment  of use  and
enjoyment  of  the  plaintiffs  land.  Having  had no  prior  hearing,  the
plaintiff charges  a due process  violation.  He  asks for money  damages
for  both  types  of  injury,  as  well  as  an  injunction  against  continua-
tion of the  alleged nuisance.  The defendant  admits,  denies,  and coun-
•terclaims  as indicated  above.  If the court  determines  that the defend-
ant  has  done  and  is  doing  nothing  which  is  a legal  cause  of legally
cognizable injury to the plaintiff, then it enters judgment for the defend-
ant  because  no  fair-hearing  duty  ever  arose.  Otherwise,  without  yet
reaching  the  question  of  whether  the  defendant's  activity  was  legally
justified,  the court  addresses itself to  the question whether the  defend-
ant has ever afforded  a fair-hearing  opportunity to the plaintiff.  If the
answer is  "no," the  court  concludes:  (a) as  to the future, the  defend-
ant should be enjoined  until such  time  as he initiates  and prevails in a
fair hearing;  but since the defendant's  counterclaim  is,  in effect,  a re-
quest to make this very  action into the requisite fair hearing,  the court
will now  decide  the  question  of legal  justification  for  the  defendant's
conduct  and grant or deny  the injunction  accordingly;08  (b)  as  to  the
67.  I  simply  assume that  there  exists  some  accessible  court  which  is  competent  to
adjudicate  the  federal  constitutional  claim.  There  may well  be  a state  court  with  the
requisite  competence.  As  presently  written,  28  U.S.C.  §  1343(3)  (1970)  might  not
cover  this  "civil  rights"  claim  (Who  has  committed  a  violation  or deprivation  "under
color of state law"?),  so  that the only  statutory basis  of  federal  district  court  jurisdic-
tion would be 28 U.S.C.  § 1331  (1970)  with its requirement that  $10,000 be in contro-
versy.
68.  Again,  I  merely assume that the tribunal  is competent  to  adjudicate  this  coun-
terclaim for declaratory relief, perhaps through pendent or ancillary jurisdiction.
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past, the  defendant  has  violated  the  plaintiff's  due  process  rights  by
causing him legally cognizable  harm without first having set up a fair-
hearing  opportunity,  and the defendant  should be required to compen-
sate  the  plaintiff  for that  due  process  violation.  But  (the  defendant
should contend) the due process violation is a legal cause of only those
losses  which  would  have been  avoided by  the defendant's  timely  per-
formance  of his  fair-hearing  duty.  This  excludes losses  caused by  ac-
tivity  which  would  have  been  held  legally  justified  at  a fair  hearing
had one been held, and requires  the court in this retrospective  portion
of the "civil  rights"  action to  adjudicate the question  of legal justifica-
tion in order to  determine  the  existence  and  extent of  the defendant's
liability in damages.69
Thus the net result of the plaintiff's  "civil rights" action closely co-
incides  with what  the  plaintiff could  have  achieved  simply by  alleging
his ordinary  substantive  claim in an  ordinary court, had one been  ac-
cessible.  In other  words, ordinary  civil actions are a method of vindi-
cating  quasi-due  process  rights,  at  least in  cases  in which  defendants
admit having  acted in a way which violated  an entitlement.  But what
of  cases  in which  the defendant  says that no entitlement  was  ever vio-
lated,  or that  no  conduct  of his  was  a legal  cause  of  any  such viola-
tion?  Of course,  the defendant's  merely saying this would  not suffice
to  establish  that  the  plaintiff's  quasi-due  process  rights were  not  at
stake; that would be established  only by an adjudication upholding the
69.  But cf.  Horton v. Orange  County Bd.  of Educ.,  464 F.2d 536  (4th Cir.  1972).
In  regard  to  the  "continuing"  harm  to  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  plaintiff's  land,
the defendant  might want to point out that once  the harm-causing  activity  became  ap-
parent to  the plaintiff, the plaintiff  could have  filed  one  of these  "civil  rights"  actions
alleging  unconstitutional  deprivation  without  due  process  (the  plaintiff  couldn't  have
filed  an  ordinary  civil  action,  under  our  assumption  that  ordinary  courts  are  inacces-
sible).  From  that point  on  (the defendant  would  continue)  a fair hearing  was  avail-
able  to the plaintiff,  and,  therefore,  the defendant  has violated fair-hearing  duties only
as  to the  first,  visible  instant  of  the harmful  activity.  The plaintiff's  rejoinder  is  that
with  each passing  instant of continuation  of  the harm, the defendant  has,  in effect, de-
cided  anew to harm the plaintiff and so has repeatedly violated the fair-hearing duty.
In regard  to the  traumatic harm,  the  defendant  might  want  to  claim  (if the  evi-
dence  is supportive)  that this  was  neither intended,  nor foreseen,  nor reasonably  fore-
seeable;  and that he  cannot, therefore,  be charged  with violation  of a fair-hearing  duty
by failure to seek a judicial  declaration of rights before the injury occurred.  The plain-
tiff's rejoinder is standard procedural  due  process fare,  and logically irrefutable:  if the
circumstances  make it unreasonable or inapposite to demand  a prior fair hearing, a sub-
sequent fair  hearing  looking  toward  restoration  or  compensation  is  required  instead.
See,  e.g.,  Phillips  v.  Commissioner,  283  U.S.  589,  595-97  (1931);  cf. Arnett  v. Ken-
nedy,  92  S.  Ct.  1633,  1656  (1974)  (White,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in
part):  "Where  the  Court has  rejected  the need for a  hearing prior to the initial  'tak-
ing,'  a principal  rationale  has been that  a hearing would be  provided before the taking
became final."
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defendant's  assertion.  It is  a fair hearing  on the  justification  for the
defendant's  denial of liability  to  submit to  a  hearing  which  the plain-
tiff  is  now,  in  effect, demanding-and  which  his ordinary  civil  action
will supply.
70
Now I want to enter a caveat and disclaimer:  Taken by itself,  the
argument of this section might seem bent upon a conclusion that a gen-
uine  duty  reposes  on  each  person  never  to  commit  any  act  which
would  foreseeably  lead  to  violation  of  another's  entitlements,  without
first obtaining  a judicial declaration  that the act would be legally justi-
fied.  I do not, of course, believe that any such duty exists.  The argu-
ment in  this  section  proceeds  from  a  deliberately  false  premise-i.e.,
that the constitutional fair-hearing  duty is charged to  all persons  rather
than  only  to  states-and  is  not  designed  to  stand  by  itself.  It  is,
rather,  a piece  of  a  larger  argument  which  contends  that  states-not
private  defendants-are  duty-bound  to  ensure  that  anyone  claiming
to  have  suffered  a legally  cognizable  injury can  receive  a fair hearing
on his claim.
c.  "State  Action"
Like most other constitutional  duties, the duty to provide fair hear-
ings  is  imposed  only  on  states  and  their  officials,  not  upon  private
agents.  Such  a  duty  on  the  part  of  states  could  be limited  to  dis-
putes in which  the  alleged violators  of legal  entitlements  are state offi-
cials, or it could  extend  to  cases in which  such  violations  are  charged
against private  persons.  I have  already  conceded,  arguendo, that  the
more limited reading is the easier to reconcile with the text of the four-
teenth  amendment  due -process clause;  and accordingly,  that the strict,
literal  constitutional  right  to  stateprovided  fair  hearings  applies  only
in  cases  of  state-authored  substantive  deprivations. 71  But  the interest
in having  the state  provide fair hearings  in cases  of privately  authored
deprivations  might nevertheless  be  a "fundamental"  or "constitutionally
protected"  one. 72  In support of just that conclusion, I propose to  show
that  (i) in terms  of  the purposes  served  and  the  interests  affected  by
the  state's  fair-hearing  duty, there is no persuasive  explanation  of  why
that duty  should  be  limited  to  cases  of  deprivations  by state  officials;
and (ii) the most  satisfying  explanation  of the  amendment's  use  of the
phrase  "No state"  rather  than "No person"  in  regard  to its  procedural
70.  Compare Case G, at text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
71.  See  text  accompanying  note  38  supra.  The  textual  issue  might look  different
in  regard  to  the  fifth  amendment  because  of the  latter's  use of passive  voice.  But  it
hardly  seems  worthwhile  here  to  question  the  conventional  assumption  that  fifth
amendment  guaranties  are  conditioned  on  a  "governmental  action"  requirement  pre-
cisely analogous to that of the fourteenth  amendment.
72.  See notes  14-20, 4344 supra and accompanying  text.
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due process  guaranty is that .the framers  simply assumed the availability
of fair hearings when deprivations were charged against private persons.7a
How  could one  explain  a constitutional  text which,  while broadly
requiring  the  state  to provide  fair hearings  upon  claims  of violations
of legally protected interests  of all sorts, limits  the guaranty to  cases  in
which state officials are charged with the violations?  Why would  our
entitlements vis-a-vis state officials be given this special concern?
There  comes to mind the possibility  of an explanation  paralleling
one which has been suggested for the  state-action  qualification on con-
stitutional  rights  such  as  those  to  equal  treatment  regardless  of  race
and freedom  of speech  and association:  to recognize  such rights vis-h-
vis other private citizens might be to limit their freedom unduly, where-
as  no such objection  can  arise to imposition of  a duty on  someone in
his capacity  as  a  public  official.74   Though the burden of staging  fair
hearings  would fall  only on the  state,  and  not on any  private  person,
it must be recognized  that a fair hearing  staged by  the state can have
onerous  consequences  for the private  adversary,  who  will  have to  ap-
pear and defend, perhaps  at considerable  monetary  and emotional cost;
and these  burdens  might be  analogized  to  the losses  of individual pri-
vacy  which  would  be  occasioned  by  allowing  free  speech  or  anti-dis-
crimination  rights to  run  against  all persons in all circumstances,  as  a
reason  why framers  might have  guaranteed  fair-hearing  rights  against
public  officials  but  not  against  private  citizens.  That  is,  one  might
somehow  associate  the  Constitution's  restriction  of  the  fair-hearing
guaranty to cases  of state-authored  deprivations  with a recognition  that
it might be bad for private citizens  to have to go about their  daily lives
under constant apprehension of being sued.
Such  a  comparison  of  the  fair-hearing  guaranty  with  the  free-
speech  and  anti-discrimination  guaranties  does  not  withstand  close
scrutiny.  There  seem  to be two  interconnected  reasons for  differenti-
ating  between  public  officials  and  private  citizens  in  regard  to  free
speech  and  anti-discrimination  duties:  First,  while  persons  acting  in
their  official  capacities  seem to have no  significant  interest, or no  in-
terest worth protecting, in being  allowed to  suppress or  discriminate in
the  ways  forbidden by  the  Constitution,  the  same  cannot  be  said  of
persons  acting  as  private  citizens;7  second,  a  constitutional  free
speech  or  anti-discrimination  guaranty  applicable  to private  as  well  as
73.  This is  not a claim  about the facts  of  history, but about the  logic of  the situ-
ation.
74.  See Part I at 1204-05.
75.  Cf. Black,  Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's  Prop-
osition 14, 81  HARv. L. REv.  69,  100-03  (1967).
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governmental  action would  prevent  legislatures and  courts  from work-
ing  out  suitable  accommodations  of  social  equality  and  free  speech
values  with competing  values  of privacy  and individual  autonomy  tra-
ditionally  ascribed  to  the  institution  of  private  ownership. 7 0  Neither
reason  seems  to  justify  differentiating  between  public  officials  and
private  citizens  when  we  come  to  consider  a  constitutional  guaranty
of  fair hearings.  It is hardly self-evident  that framers  would be more
concerned  about  securing  private  citizens  than public  officials  against
fear of  being  sued.  To  be  sued  as  an  official  may  be  no  less  emo-
tionally  distressing  than  to  be  sued  as  a private  person,  and  no  less
fraught  with  risk  of  undesired  consequences  (for  example,  tarnished
reputation  or blighted  career  prospects);  and  the threat  of  such  suits
may be  as damaging  to boldness  and efficiency  in the public service  as
in private  enterprise.  Moreover,  a fair-hearing  guaranty  broadly  ap-
plicable to cases  of private  as well  as governmental  deprivations would
in no way prevent  legislatures  and  courts from giving  as much weight
as  they judge  desirable  to  the  social  and  personal interest  in freedom
from  burdensome  fears  about  being  sued.  Legislatures  and  courts
can  always  achieve  the  desired  balances  through  their  definitions  of
legally  cognizable  injury  and  legal  cause.77  Once  those  definitions
are fixed, it is they which create zones of legally risky conduct and gen-
erate  any  burdensome  apprehensions  about  becoming  subject  to  suit.
Constitutional protection for the fair-hearing  rights of persons  claiming
to  have  suffered  injury  from  such  risky  conduct  is  not  a  significant
additional  source  of apprehension;  such  protections  merely reduce  the
likelihood  that  a person  subjected  to  such  apprehension  by  the sub-
stantive law will  be  able  to  escape  liability  which  the  law presumably
means  to make him apprehensive  about.  That seems  most particularly
true  of  the  specific  manifestation  of  constitutional  protection  for  the
fair-hearing  right for which I am here  arguing-protection  against de-
nial of hearing by exclusionary access fees.
But  how,  then,  might we  explain  why  the  constitutional  protec-
tion for fair-hearing  rights  is  verbally  conditioned  on violations  of en-
titlements  by  state  officials?  The  most  satisfactory  rationalization  I
can think of is  simply that framers  would not worry about the problem
except  in regard  to  claims  against  public  officials.  They  would  nat-
urally  assume  that in  all  other  cases  recourse  could  be  had through
judicial or quasi-judicial forums spontaneously  provided by the  state it-
self.78  In fact, the supposed  availability  of such recourse  seems  to be
76.  See Peterson v. City  of Greenville,  373  U.S.  244,  250  (1963)  (Harlan,  J.,  con-
curring); Part  I at 1204-05.
77.  See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
78.  In the  Civil Rights  Cases,  109  U.S.  3,  17,  24  (1883),  the  Supreme  Court justi-
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most or all of what it means,  in our legal culture, to say that a legally
cognizable  injury  has  occurred.79   But  perhaps  framers  could  re-
main  apprehensive  that  state  officials  on  occasion  would,  perhaps
even  with  legislative  authorization,  act in  contradiction  of  extant  le-
gal  (including  constitutional)  entitlements  while  refusing  to  submit
to  judicial  or  quasi-judicial  review  of  their  actions  . 0   The  constitu-
tional guaranty  of procedural due process,  then, can perhaps be ration-
alized  as  a response  to  the  spectre  of  totally  exclusionary  "jurisdic-
tional"  invocations  of  official  immunity;  and  that would  explain  why
the  guaranty  is  written with  specific  reference  to  deprivations  by the
state.8'
fied  its limiting construction  of the fourteenth  amendment's  due  process  and equal pro-
tection guaranties by reference to just such an assumption:
[The Negroes'  legal]  rights remain  in full force,  and may  presumably  be  vin-
dicated by resort to the laws of the state for redress  .. . . [These  rights are]
properly  cognizable  by  the  laws  of  the State,  and presumably  subject  to  re-
dress by those laws ....
Compare Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STA-N.  L. Rav. 3, 16-17 (1961).
79.  Compare  note 57 supra and text accompanying notes  6-7, supra.
80.  Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown  Named  Agents  of Fed.  Bureau of  Narcotics,
403  U.S.  388  (1971),  where  the  government  contended  that  the  fourth  amendment
merely limited  the  extent  to which  federal  agents  could  defend  against  a  state law  tort
suit by asserting that their actions  constituted a valid  exercise  of federal  power.  Id. at
390-91.  The majority rejected this argument on  the ground that the fourth amendment
proscribes a broader  range  of action than  simply such  conduct  as would  be  actionable
under state  law.  See also Monroe  v. Pape,  365  U.S.  167,  194-95  (1961)  (Harlan,  I.,
concurring).
81.  See notes  56-60 supra and  accompanying  text.  Cf.  Dunham, Due Process and
Commercial Lai,  1972  Sup. Cr.  R v.  135,  150-52;  Albert,  supra note  50,  at  444:
"[A]  private  citizen  does  not  commit  a  trespass  if  he  demands  and  is  granted  ad-
mission  to  one's  home,  since  the  homeowner  may  lock  the  door  or  call  the  police.
This  immunity,  however,  cannot  be  extended  to  consent  extracted  by  a police  officer
in this manner.'"
The argument can be illustrated by the case  of repossession  of chattel security  from
a  supposedly  defaulting  conditional  vendee.  The  vendee's  continued  possession  of the
chattel  is  "property"--an  "entitlement"--in  the DPDP  sense  that  under  the local  sub-
stantive  law  it would  be  a legal  wrong  to the  vendee for  anyone  to intrude  upon his
possession  unless  there  exists  some  objectively  verifiable  justification  such  as  default.
See  text  accompanying  notes  53-54  supra.  Under  Fuentes  v.  Shevin,  407  U.S.  67
(1972),  if  state  officers  seize  the  security  without granting  a  fair-hearing  opportunity,
they thereby violate the DPDP  guaranty  irrespective of whether  there has actually been
a  default.  See  also  Mitchell  v. W.T.  Grant  Co.,  94  S.  Ct.  1895  (1974).  Granting
arguendo that a private  creditor's  self-help  seizure, sans hearing,  would  not violate  the
DPDP guaranty, what reason can we give to explain the discrepancy?
To  say  that  a  debtor's  continued  possession  is  DPDP-protected  "property"--that
unjustified  interference  is a  legal wrong  under  local law-is  virtually  to say  that  debt-
ors  can obtain  redress  against unjustified private  seizures  in some  state tribunal,  so  that
a constitutional  fair-hearing  guaranty  would seem  redundant.  But there  is no such  ap-
pearance  of redundancy  in  the case  of seizure  by  state  officials:  were  it not  for  the
DPDP  guaranty,  one could  easily imagine that state officials  might be declared immune
from having  to justify their entitlement-violating  acts in  any state tribunal.  (Congress
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It  seems  that only  by  assuming  the  availability  of  state  judicial
or  quasi-judicial  forums,  unencumbered  by  notions  of  official  im-
munity,  to provide fair hearings  of legal grievances  against private par-
ties,  can one  explain  a  constitutional  fair-hearing  guaranty  limited  to
grievances  against  officials.  There  just is no  other  satisfying  explana-
tion  for  the  state  action  qualification  on  a  procedural  due  process
guaranty  having  the  otherwise  expansive  application  confirmed  by the
Fuentes and Sindermann cases.  The ends  pursued  by procedural  due
process  are, then, at stake whenever the state would totally  deny a fair
hearing  to  a citizen alleging  a "good"  cause of action.  The plaintiff's
access  to  such  a hearing  is,  therefore,  if not a part of procedural  due
process  itself,  a  "preferred  freedom"  or  "fundamental  interest"  con-
did not go that far in section  6 of the Lloyd-La-Folette  Act,  5 U.S.C.  § 7501  (1970).
Had it  done  so,  six  justices  would  have  considered  such  action  unconstitutional.  See
Arnett v. Kennedy, 94 S.  Ct.  1633  (1974),  discussed in note 52 supra.).  Could the state
maintain  an official-immunity  scheme  against  DPDP attack  by, for  example,  "substan-
tively"  conditioning  all  possessory  entitlements  on  the  continuing,  discretionary  toler-
ance of certain officials, so that seizure by those  officials  could never violate the entitle-
ment as thus defined  and so would  never have  to be  objectively justified,  and,  accord-
ingly, could never trigger a fair-hearing demand?  It  seems  extremely  unlikely that  any
state  would wish  to  establish such  a  doctrine  as  part  of its  substantive  law.  Even  if
some  state  did  so  choose,  it seems  that  serious  questions  would  be  raised  under  the
"delegation"  (as distinguished from the fair-hearing)  aspect of the due process  guaranty.
See, eg., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.  183, 270 (1971)  (Brennan,  J., dissenting).
Such a view of the  DPDP  guaranty-as  directed  against  state  attempts  to immu-
nize public  officials  from  having to  submit  their  justifications  for entitlement-violating
actions to  impartial  examination  in fair hearings--may invite  the objection  that it fails
to explain  why due  process should  sometimes  be  read,  as in  Fuentes, to impose  an af-
firmative duty  upon state  officials  though not private  agents  to  stage fair hearings  be-
fore they  proceed  with  their encroachments  upon  legally  protected  interests.  But  see
Mitchell  v.  W.T.  Grant  Co.,  94  S.  Ct.  1895  (1974).  Since  extension  to  private
entitlement-violators  of  the  affirmative  duty  to  instigate  a  prior hearing  would  not
be  merely  redundant  of  what  is  already  implied  by  the  entitlement's  existence,  per-
haps  the  redundancy  notion  fails  to  explain  why  the  DPDP  guaranty  applies  only
to  deprivations  by  state  officials.  But  if  extension  of  an  affirmative,  prior-hearing
requirement to  private  agents would  not be  precisely  redundant,  it might very  well  be
either fruitless or  intolerable.  How  could  the  system  hope  to enforce  an  affirmative
obEgation  on  the  part of  all  persons  to instigate  a fair  hearing  before  proceeding  to
violate  any  entitlement,  except  through  after-the-fact,  retrospective  proceedings  and
remedies,  more  or  less  paralleling  those  which  could  be  obtained  in  civil  actions
founded directly  on  the entitlement-creating  local  law?  (See  notes  68-70 supra and  ac-
companying  text.)  Laws  purporting  to  authorize  public  officials  to  commit  depriva-
tions without prior hearings  can be  judicially declared  invalid;  defined  classes  of public
officials  can,  as  found  necessary  from  time  to  time,  be  judicially  enjoined  from thus
proceeding;  it  is  even  quite  possible  to  fashion  general  punitive  sanctions  to  prevent
public officials  from flouting an  affirmative, prior-hearing  duty.  But injunctions cannot
issue  against  the  general  public;  and  it  is  easily  understandable  that  constitutional
draftsmen would look with disfavor upon the imposition of an affirmative, prior-hearing
duty upon private  persons,  which  could  not be  effectively  enforced  otherwise  than  by
exposing  us  all to the  risk  of punishment  (not merely  compensatory  sanctions)  when-
ever we violate civil entitlements without having first instigated fair hearings.
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tained  within  substantive  due  process  liberty.  That  an  out-of-court,
voluntary settlement may be attainable is of no consequence.  Nor does
it matter  in  the  least  that  the  interest  for  which  legal  protection  is
claimed "does not rise to the... constitutional level."82
Speaking  with  utmost precision,  the  right of  litigation  access  to
which  the  argument in this section directly  points is not, necessarily,  a
right  of access  to every judicial  forum which would be open to a mon-
eyed disputant  in otherwise  similar circumstances-or  even of any  ac-
cess at all to  a tribunal commonly or formally styled a "court."  What
the  argument  directly  points  to  is  a right  to  at  least one  "fair  hear-
ing"  on the  merits  of one's  claims,  before  a judicial  or  quasi-judicial
tribunal  characterized  by the  independence  and neutrality  of  its  deci-
sion-maker  and its  use of -adversary procedures  (or else  of some  other
procedures which  allow the claimant both to communicate his own con-
tentions  effectively  and to  secure  a thorough  probing of his  adversary's.
contentions).  The  argument  does  not-at  least  directly-establish
any claim to having one's claims  heard  and disposed of before a "judi-
cial"  as  distinguished  from an  "administrative"  body,  or by  a  "judge"
as  distinguished  from  a  "hearing  officer";  nor  does  it  establish  any
claim  to  appeal  or  to  judicial  review,  once  a  fair  hearing  has  been
received.
83
Of  course,  there  may  be  subsidiary  arguments  which  would  suc-
ceed  in expanding  the  due  process-inspired  access  right to  mean  spe-
cifically  access  to  court (where judicial  jurisdiction  exists)  and beyond
that to  include  a  right  to  appeal  (where  appeal  would  normally  be
available).  Would  not  serious  questions  be  raised  by  a  state's  at-
tempt to maintain  two noticeably  different  sets  of nisi prius tribunals,
one  of  which  charged  access  fees  while  the  other  was  available  to
functionally  indigent  claimants  (and  also,  perhaps,  to  anyone  else
who  preferred  not  to  pay  fees)?  The  indigent  claimant  is  entitled  to
a  "fair"  hearing  opportunity.  Precisely  how  does  the  hearing  he  can
obtain  in  the  "free"  tribunal  vary  from that  offered  in  the nisi prius
court  of general  jurisdiction?  Do  these variations  spell  the  difference
between  a  hearing  opportunity  which  is  fair  and one  which  isn't?  If
not, why does  the state bother to maintain the fee-restricted tribunal-
which is presumably  more  expensive  to operate?  (If it  isn't more ex-
pensive,  why  does  it  charge  fees  while  the other  tribunal doesn't?)  I
82.  United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973).  See Part I at 1160.
83.  See United States v. Kras,  409  U.S. 434, 462 n.5  (1973)  (Marshall,  J.,  dissent-
ing);  Comment,  supra  note  8,  at 588-89.  Thus  the  decision  in  Ortwein  v.  Schwab,
410 U.S.  656 (1973)-though  by no means  all of  the per curiam opinion's  reasoning-
can  be  reconciled  with  the  argument  in  this  section.  See  id. at  659-60  & n.4.  Cf.
Comment, supra, at 589-90.
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do  not suggest  that these  questions  will  necessarily  be  unanswerable;
but they probably will not be easy to answer.  The same arguments  are
relevant when the question is that of access to an appealA4
B.  GOVERNMENTAL  JUSTIFICATIONS  FOR COURT
AccEss FEES
1.  The Doctrines
The  notion of litigation  access  as  a fundamental  interest  or pre-
ferred  freedom  can be  regarded  as  a doctrinal  weapon  to  be  wielded
against various  governmental  practices  cramping  the exercise  or enjoy-
ment  of that interest,  such  as  the  practice  of  charging  filing  fees  that
have  the  effect  of  totally  excluding  whoever  cannot  afford  to  pay
them.  Still,  the question  remains  whether  there  might be  some  suffi-
cient  governmental  justification  for  maintaining  a  filing  fee  schedule
and applying it even to the indigent.
Distinguishable,  though  overlapping,  governmental  objectives
which  might  be  served  by  court  filing  fees  seem  to include:  (1) as-
surance that the plaintiff  has  something  at  stake which  is  of palpable
and  particular,  as  distinguished  from merely  abstract  and  theoretical,
concern  to him-that  a genuine  "case  or  controversy"  exists  and  that
policies  opposed to  judicial  rendition  of  advisory  opinions  will  be  re-
spected;  (2) prevention  of litigation  where  the practical  stakes  are  so
small,  or the probabilities  of victory so remote,  as not to be worth the
social resources  consumed  by the  litigation  process;  (3)  protection  of
defendants  against  harassment  by  "vexatious"  litigation;  (4)  produc-
84.  For indications of how the  suggested line  of  questions  might be  answered,  see
Ross v. Moffit  42 U.S.L.W. 4940  (U.S.  June  16,  1974).  In addition,  of course,  one
might want to try the approach of Griffin v. Illinois,  351  U.S.  12  (1956),  arguing that
to divert the claims of functionally indigent persons to one of a pair of tribunals between
which  others are free to choose,  or to deny functionally indigent persons  appeals  which
are accessible to others,  constitutes invidious discrimination  by wealth forbidden  by the
equal  protection  clause.  See  Boddie  v.  Connecticut,  401  U.S.  371,  388-89  (1971)
(Brennan,  J., dissenting).  Ross v. Moffit,  supra, bodes  ill  for this  line  of  argument,
although  the possibility remains  open that  the Court would  distinguish  between  refusal
of  free  counsel  and  imposition  of  exclusionary  fees.  It  is  unclear  whether  or  how
far the  Griffin equal protection  theory  will  be  extended  beyond  the  procedural  claims
of  criminal  defendants.  Following  the  lead  of the  Rodriguez  opinion,  it  might  be
hard for  an indigent  civil  claimant  who  had  been  granted  a  fair  quasi-judicial  hear-
ing,  but  been  denied  access  to  a  trial-level  or  appellate  court,  to  persuade  the  Su-
preme  Court  that  he  had  suffered  "an  absolute  deprivation  of  a  meaningful  oppor-
tunity  to  enjoy  [the]  benefit"  of  a due-process  hearing.  411  U.S.  at  20.  It  is  true
that  the logic  of  Griffin would  allow  narrower  description  of  the benefit  in  question,
as  an opportunity  to be heard  before a particular tribunal.  Yet the Rodriguez opinion
explicitly  treats  Griffin  as  a  "criminal"  case,  see  411  U.S.  at  17-18,  20-22.  On  the
other  hand,  the  argument  which  would  justify  confinement  of the  Griffin theory  to
criminal  contexts  remains unclear.  See  Brickman, supra note  31,  at  608-09.  See  also
text accompanying notes 104-06 infra.
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tion  of revenue  for  the  state  treasury;  (5)  allocative  efficiency  in  the
economy,  achieved by "internalizing" costs to those  who stand to bene-
fit from the costly activities. 8 5
The first  three  objectives  share  a common  core  of  concern with
screening  out  frivolous,  unworthy,  or  objectionable  uses  of the state's
judicial  system.  But,  as  the  Supreme  Court  has  several  times  recog-
nized  in  analogous  contexts, 6  the screen provided by flat  fees is too
crude-too  coarse-grained  in  some  respects,  too fine-grained  in others
-to  withstand  the demands  for  "close  fit" and  "least restrictive  alter-
natives"  which  always  arise  when  government  undertakes  to  regulate
exercise or enjoyment of a protected right of interest.87
Frivolity, after all, is a matter of  degree.  So, too, is the deterrent
effect  of  a  modest,  flat  fee-which  almost  certainly  varies  inversely
with  the  wealth  and  income  of  the prospective  litigant.  Thus,  com-
mon  sense  advises,  the  wealthy  will  be  deterred  only  haphazardly;
the  functionally  indigent  will  be  totally  "deterred"  (if  such  an  odd
use  of  the  word  is  allowable);  and  the  in-between  will  be  deterred
to  an  extent.  Modest,  flat fees  make no  dependable  contribution  to
dissuading  the  affluent  from theoretical  or  extortionate  litigation;  but
they  can  make  it  absolutely  impossible  for  the  indigent  to litigate  in
good  faith.  "Deterrence,"  in  any  acceptable  sense  of that  term,  can
be  depended upon  to  operate only on  that group  of citizens  to whom,
say,  fifty dollars  will seem  neither a prohibitive  sum nor, on the  other
hand,  a  trifling  amount  to pay  for  the privilege  of demanding  one's
rights.
88
Moreover,  the  government  has  available  to it  alternative  means
for  controlling  abusive  resort to  the courts-means  which  plainly  are
closer-fitting  than  flat fees  and,  at least  as  applied to  the functionally
indigent,  are  also  plainly  less  restrictive  of  the  exercise  of  litigation
rights.  The  most  obvious  possibility  is  increased  reliance  on  pre-
trial screening  of  individual  cases.  No  doubt this  would  be  adminis-
85.  Compare Brickman,  supra note 31,  at 638.  As  a matter  of economic  analysis,
goal  (5)  may seem to include  goals  (2)  and  (3).  Yet  it is clarifying  for legal  analy-
sis to distinguish between  the all-encompassing  goal of efficiency which  can be achieved
only  through  a system  of  "general"  or  "market"  deterrence,  and  goals  cast  narrowly
enough-in  terms of  preventing  specific  "abuses"--to  be  achievable  through  "specific'
or "collective"  deterrence.  For the  terminology  of  general  and  specific  deterrence,  see
generally  G.  CALAanEsI,  TbB  CosTs  OF  AccmniNrs:  A  LwAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ANALY-
51  (1970);  Michelman, Book Review, 80 YALE  L.J. 647, 661-66  (1971).
86.  Cf.  Lubin  v. Panish,  94  S.  Ct.  1315  (1974);  Bullock  v. Carter,  405  U.S.  134,
145-46  (1972);  Lindsey  v.  Normet,  405  U.S.  56,  78  (1972);  Boddie  v.  Connecticut,
401 U.S.  371,  381-82  (1971);  Comment, supra  note 8, at 584.
87.  See  e.g., Cleveland  Bd. of  Educ.  v. LaFleur, 94  S.  Ct. 791  (1974);  Kramer  v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.  621  (1969).
88.  See Brickman, supra note 31,  at 639.
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tratively more difficult  and expensive than  simple reliance  on flat fees.
Yet any increased costs might well be of that modest  or middling magni-
tude  which  the  Supreme  Court  would  categorize  as  "administrative
convenience"  or  "efficiency,"  considerations  which  the Court  has  re-
peatedly  said  cannot  alone  justify  governmental  restriction  of  enjoy-
ment of protected rights or interests.89
We  come  now  to  the  fourth  primary  objective-that  of  raising
revenue  for  the state  treasury.  Perhaps  court  filing  fees  can  be  ex-
plained  simply  as  a  general  revenue  measure,  an  excise  imposed
upon the activity  of resorting  to the  tribunals of justice.  But if access
to those tribunals is, as I have argued,  a constitutionally recognized  and
protected  interest,  then  the  Supreme  Court's  decisions  in Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 9"  Grosjean v.  American Press Co., 9"  and Harper v.  Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 9" indicate that an excise which is specially fo-
cussed  on enjoyment  of the protected fair-hearing  interest, and in that
sense discriminates  against such enjoyment, may well be invalid even as
applied to persons able to pay the fee.9"
However,  as  first indicated  in Cox v.  New  Hampshire, 94  and  re-
cently  confirmed  in the  air-passenger  fee case,  Evansville-Vanderburgh
Airport Authority District v.  Delta Airlines, Inc.,9 5  reliance  on  the
unconstitutional-excise  analysis  is  perilous  where  the  exaction  is  im-
posed  on those  who  voluntarily  seek  access  to  a state-supported  facil-
ity.  In such circumstances,  even where  access is sought in pursuit of a
constitutionally  favored  interest, the  Supreme  Court has  sometimes  al-
lowed  the  exaction  to be  justified as  a resource-allocating  user charge,
despite the  appearance  of rather  extreme crudity  in the  exaction  when
measured by such a purpose.
This  brings  us  to  the  fifth  primary  objective,  that  of  perfecting
the  allocation  of resources  by  assigning  costs  to  those who  choose  to
incur  them.  The  governmental  interest  in  "resource  allocation"  is
89.  See,  e.g.,  Cleveland  Bd. of Educ.  v. LaFleur,  94 S.  Ct.  791,  799  (1974);  Stan-
ley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.  645, 656 (1972).
90.  319  U.S.  105  (1943).
91.  297  U.S.  233  (1936).  The  Grosjean case,  involving  an  excise  on  newspaper
publishing,  may  be distinguishable  because  of  a discriminatory  feature  of the excise,  in-
dicating  that it was  actually aimed  at disadvantaging  certain,  particular publishers.  See
id. at 251.
92.  383  U.S.  663  (1966).  The "poll  tax"  invalidated  in Harper  was  not an excise
on the activity of voting but a capitation  tax payable  irrespective  of voting, see Harper
v. Virginia  State Bd.  of Elections,  240 F. Supp.  270,  271  (E.D.  Va.  1964),  although
denial  of voting  privileges may have been the only  sanction  actually employed.  Harper
thus may support the proposition in the text  a fortiori,  but supports it in any case.
93.  See Willging, supra note 31,  at 283-85.
94.  312  U.S.  569  (1941).  See Willging, supra  note 31,  at 284.
95.  405  U.S.  707  (1972).
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really a  congeries  of distinguishable  interests  each  of which  could ra-
tionally be pursued for its own sake.  There  is, most  obviously,  an in-
terest in efficiency-in  devoting  to each use of the judicial system  just
as  many  dollars worth of resources,  and no more,  as cannot be  other-
wise  deployed  with  a greater  output  of  "welfare"  (given  the  existing
distribution  of  income) .9  Quite  distinct  in principle  from  concerns
about efficiency, though for economic theorists happily intertwined with
them,  is the interest in maintaining  a "proper"  distribution  of income.
If  each  person must  pay  for  each  use  of  the justice  system  the  true
marginal  cost of that use,  then the state's  provision of justice  d6es  not
become  a  vehicle  for  underhanded  disturbance  of  whatever  distribu-
tion  has  otherwise  been  achieved.  Any  desired  adjustments  of,  say,
the "market" or "natural" distribution is left to explicit, deliberate legis-
lative action.
Although what the Supreme Court did in the  Cox and Evansville
cases  apparently  allows  states to justify user-charge  restriction  of  exer-
cise  of protected  rights  by  reference  to  a resource-allocation  interest,
the Court has not invariably been so permissive.  In Bullock v. Carter
the  Court  confronted  Texas'  argument  that  "since  the  candidates  are
availing  themselves  of  the  primary  machinery,  it is  appropriate  that
they pay  [in the form  of flat filing  fees, varied according  to the office
sought]  that  share  of the  cost  that they  have  occasioned. '97   In  the
course of rejecting that argument, the Court said:
Viewing  the  myriad  governmental  functions  supported  from  general
revenues,  it is  difficult to single out any of a higher order than the con-
duct of elections at all levels to bring forth those persons desired by their
fellow  citizens to govern.  Without making light of the State's interest in
husbanding  its  revenues,  we fail  to see such  an element  of necessity  in
the State's present means  of financing primaries  as  to justify  the result-
ing incursion on the prerogatives of voters.9 3
96.  The previously  discussed  interest  in deterring  "frivolous"  resort to judicial  ma-
chinery  is  in  part  a  cruder  version  of  the  interest  in  efficiency,  and  perhaps  also in
part  the  embodiment  of  a  moral  concern  about  abusive  or vexatious  resort to judicial
process.
97.  Bullock v. Carter,  405 U.S.  134,  147-48  (1972).  It is  interesting  to note  that
the  Court's  order in  Bullock invalidated  the filing  fee practice  as  a whole,  not merely
the exclusionary  application  of the fee  requirement  to functionally indigent  candidates;
that is,  the Court affirmed a lower court decision  which  simply enjoined  future  enforce-
ment,  against  anyone,  of the filing  fee  requirements.  Carter  v. Wischkaemper,  321  F.
Supp.  1358,  1363  (N.D.  Tex. 1970).  Yet Chief Justice Burger's  opinion  often  suggests
that exclusionary application  of fees  was the  issue before  the Supreme  Court.  See,  e.g.,
405  U.S.  at  141-42  & n.17.  That  clearly  was  the  issue  in  the  recent  case  of Lubin
v.  Panish, 94 S.  Ct. 1315  (1974).  See also Johnston v. Luna,  338 F.  Supp.  355  (N.D.
Tex.  1972).
98.  405 U.S.  at 148-49.  But cf.  id. at 148 n.29.
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Texas, in short, could not treat a candidate's use of its electoral  system
as  a "commodity"  to be sold only to those willing and  able  to pay the
cost.
May  a  state, then,  treat use  of its justice  system that  way?  Is  a
charge  for  costs  occasioned  by  one's  use  of  the  justice  system  more
like such a charge for use of a publicly financed physical facility,  as in
Cox and Evansville, or more like one  for use of the electoral system  as
in Bullock?  One  might  think  the  electoral-system  analogy  the  closer
one,  insofar  as it is  true for both the justice system  and  the  electoral
system, but not for the use of physical facilities, that the essence of the
claim resides  in the general  prospect  of practically  available  access  on
an equal or standard  footing with every one else.99  On the other hand,
court  access  may  seem  to  resemble  access  to  streets  and  airports  in
posing a need  to ration a limited facility susceptible  to overcrowding-
a need less evident in regard to access to the ballot, but still there when
we  recall  concern  for  the  virtues  of  "short  ballots."  In  any  case,
the Bullock court was  obviously  concerned  about protecting  the access
of voters as well  as that  of candidates to the  electoral  system,  reason-
ing that a  likely effect of  sizeable  fee requirements  would  be  to  bias
the  resulting  pool  of  candidates  in  a manner  disadvantageous  to  the
interests  of  a  distinguishable  group  of  voters.  Thus  a  narrow  state-
ment of the Bullock Court's objection to general use of the fee require-
ments (and perhaps  also  of the  Court's objection to  exclusionary  appli-
cation  of  fees  to  functionally  indigent  candidates)  might  be  that  the
rights  of  voternv must  not be  made  to  depend  on  the  willingness  or
ability of candidates  to pay fees.
Bullock has  undergone  subsequent  interpretation  by  the Supreme
Court  which  seems  to  make  it a much  surer  precedent  when  we  re-
strict  focus  to  the  question  of  exclusionary  impact  of  filing  fees  on
functionally  indigent  candidates.  On  this  question,  Bullock has been
assimilated  by the  Court's  commentary  in Rodriguez'" 0  into  the  com-
pany  of  Griffin v.  Illinois.'1 0  Texas'  resource-allocation  argument  in
Bullock  was  not  enough  to  overcome  the  crucial facts  (as  the  Court
viewed them  in Rodriguez) that the  fees  "effectively  barred  all  poten-
tial  candidates  who  were  unable  to  pay  the required  fee"  and  that
"inability to pay  [thus]  occasioned  an  absolute  denial  of  a position  on
the primary ballot."  In context, these statements suggest concern  about
violation  of  the  interests  of  individual  indigent  candidates  who  were
effectively excluded by the fees.  It is true ,that in its Rodriguez restate-
99.  See text accompanying notes 26-36, supra.
100.  411  U.S.  at 22.
101.  351  U.S.  12  (1956).
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ment of Bullock the Court also noted that the  Texas fees  were sizable,
"often running into the thousands  of dollars,"'1 2 but it was  never clear
why that fact should affect application  of the  effective-exclusion  princi-
ple,  as  long  as  some  would  be  "effectively  barred"  even  by  much
smaller  fees;  and  Lubin  v.  Panish03  has  now  established  that  the
principle covers fees of any size.
The  effective-exclusion  principle  was  also,  of  course,  invoked  in
Boddle.  Addressing  "the  State's  asserted  interest  in  its  fee  and  cost
requirements  as  a  mechanism  of  resource  allocation  or cost  recoup-
ment,"  Justice Harlan's Boddie opinion noted that "such  a justification
was offered  and rejected in Griffin v. Illinois," and concluded that "the
rationale  of  Griffin covers  this  case."' 4  Especially  given the breadth
and lack  of  articulation  of the  rationale  tendered in  Griffin, there  is
no apparent reason why it would not similarly cover any  case in which
the  exclusionary  application  of  access  fees  to  impecunious  litigants
is treated  as "suspect" because repugnant to  the proposed constitutional
right  of standard  juridical  access.  In  this  connection,  it  is  interesting
to  contemplate  the  Court's  remarks  about  the  Griffin  rationale  in
Mayer v.  Chicago:1 05  "Griffin does  not  represent  a  balance  between
the  needs  of  the  accused  and  the interests of society;  its principle  is a
flat prohibition  against  pricing  indigent defendants  out of  as  effective
an appeal  as  would be  available  to others  able to  pay  their  own  way
....  The State's fiscal interest is, therefore, irrelevant."'1 0 6
2.  The Implications
In  its  Rodriguez opinion,  relying  upon  Griffin and Bullock, the
Supreme  Court indicated  that the strict review  which  attends  recogni-
tion  of  some  "benefit"  as  essential  to  enjoyment  of  a constitutionally
favored  interest  includes,  as  one  component,  a  demand  for  "compel-
ling"  justification  whenever  the  state  acts  or  organizes  its  affairs  in
such  a way that some persons,  "because  of  their impecunity  . . . [are]
completely  unable  to  pay  for  . . . [that]  benefit,  and  as  a  conse-
quence,  they  [sustain]  an  absolute  deprivation  of  a  meaningful  op-
portunity  to  enjoy  that  benefit."'17  A  part  of  strict  review,  then,
102.  411  U.S.  at 22.
103.  94 S. Ct. 1315 (1974).
104.  401  U.S.  at  382.
105.  404  U.S.  189  (1971).
106.  Id. at  196-97.  Cf.  Fuentes v.  Shevin,  407  U.S.  67,  90  n.22  (1972):  "Proce-
dural  due  process  is  not  intended  to promote  efficiency  or  accommodate  all  possible
interests;  it is  intended  to  protect  the  particular  interests  of  the  person  whose  posses-
sions are about to be taken."
107.  411  U.S.  at 20.
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seems  to be a very heavy presumption  against  exclusionary  application
of state-imposed  fees  conditioning  access  to or  enjoyment  of  constitu-
tionally protected rights and interests.
Thus,  if we  take  the Rodriguez dicta for  all  they  are worth,  we
can  arrive  at  a proposition  which  to  some  may seem rather  startling:
Constitutional designation  of some personal  interest,  as one  which mer-
its special judicial  solicitude  against  excessive  governmental  encroach-
ment,  is  tantamount  to  a  constitutional  command  that,  at least  inso-
far  as  the government  acts  as  the  exclusive  source  of benefits  or serv-
ices which  directly  support enjoyment  of such  an interest, it must pro-
vide  those  services  free  of  charge  to -the functionally  indigent.'03  The
startling character of that proposition  seems to be simply a reflection of
how  thoroughly  unaccustomed  we  are  to  think  that  anyone  can  be
entitled to receive costly benefits without paying for them.
Those who  are  startled will have  to come  to terms somehow  with
the Boddie, Bullock,  and Griffin decisions,  as  well  as with  the Rodri-
guez dicta.  It might help  if we could  explain  the  startling doctrine-
the  heavy  presumption  against  the  exclusionary  application  of  state-
imposed fees conditioning  enjoyment of  constitutionally protected  rights
-as  merely  an  application  of  demands  for  "close  fit"  and  "least
restrictive  alternatives"  which  everyone  seems  to  accept as  appropriate
when  governments  would  limit  such  enjoyment.  But  such  an  ex-
planation,  though initially  appealing,  proves  to be  difficult to  sustain.
What resource-allocation  purpose is  served  by exclusionary  insist-
ence  upon  a fee  from  a person  who  simply cannot  afford  to  pay  it?
The  special  attractiveness  of fees-more  broadly,  prices-as  resource
allocators lies in their unmatched  power to  elicit from  those for whose
benefit  costs  may  (or may  not) be  incurred  the  most  reliable  sort  of
testimony  as to whether the benefits  are worth the  costs.  But no such
revelation  ensues from attachment  of  a  fee  condition  to provision  of  a
good  or  service  to  persons  having  no  money  or  credit  to  spare.  To
deduce,  from  a  starving  pauper's  abstention  from  bread-buying,  that
giving  him  a  loaf  would  not  yield  benefits  in  excess  of  costs,  is  to
carry  to  an  absurd  extreme  a normally healthy skepticism  about inter-
personal  comparisons  of utilities.  In such a case,  an, ad hoc collective
evaluation  of the  "worth"  of a benefit to a claimant would not only be
less  restrictive  of  the  claimant's  enjoyment  of  the  benefit  than would
be reliance  on an exclusionary  fee;  ad hoc  collective  evaluation  would
also  tend  strongly  to  be a somewhat  more  accurate  resource-allocator
108.  The  question  of  affirmative  governmental  duty  to assure  that indigent  persons
can procure  such services  from  someone  is  real  and  important,  but beyond  the  scope
of the present  discussion.  See Tribe, supra  note  11,  at 44-50.
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than the exclusionary  fee,  because  an  exclusionary  fee  is  utterly with-
out discriminating power." 0 9
Yet  it must  be  recognized  that  any  collective-evaluation  device
has its own  administrative  costs,  and that these  costs might be greatly
multiplied  if  the  use  of  such  devices  to  screen  out  unworthy  claims
could  not  be  confined  to  cases  of  functionally  indigent  persons  but
rather  would  have  to  be  extended  to  all  litigants  if  applied  to  any.
Thus  insofar  as  new  collective-evaluation  devices  are  introduced,  and
the  use  of existing  such  devices  is  increased,  to  take  up  slack left  by
abolition  of  exclusionary  flat  fees,  it  seems  quite possible  that  an  in-
crease  in  administrative  costs  might  result  which  could  more  than
offset any accompanying resource-allocation gains.
If a state were to argue along these lines for retention of a simple fee
system with no  exceptions for the indigent, it might look as though  the
argument  would run  into  the  Supreme Court's  unwillingness  to  accept
"administrative  convenience"  and  "efficiency"  as  excuses  for  a state's
not  using  the  "closest-fitting,"  least  "restrictive"  means  available  to
achieve its valid objectives, when  a  constitutionally protected interest  is
involved.10  But can the Court maintain  this position when  the broad
goal  of  allocative  efficiency  is  itself  cited  as  the  state's  underlying
objective?  Does the Court's position mean that the broad goal of allo-
cative  efficiency  (as  distinguished  from  more  narrowly  defined  goals
of deterring  specific  abuses  such  as  vexatious  litigation)  is  utterly  un-
available  as  a justification  for governmental  practices  seriously  imped-
ing  the exercise  of protected  rights?  The  answer to the  last question
may well be "yes,"  but that might not render  any less  startling the im-
plications of Boddie, Bullock, Griffin, and Rodriguez.
We can  try  another  tack.  imagine  that  the  state  offers  the  fol-
lowing  defense  of  its  insistence  on  pricing  the  use  of  its  justice  sys-
tem and refusing  to make exceptions  for the indigent:  "It is a mistake
to single out any  particular good or service,  from among  all which  are
available on the market,  and then  argue that the worth of that benefit
to a severely impoverished  person is not accurately  gauged by his offer-
ing  price.  That  particular  good  or  service  is  never  the  only  one
which  the  indigent  person  wants  or  needs,  and  allowing  .the  price
system  to  operate  even  against  him is  the  best way  to  discover  what
his own  priorities  are,  given  the  budgetary  constraint  imposed  by  his
109.  "Collective"  evaluation  of  the worth  of a  legal  claim  would  mean  evaluation
by some official  agency,  for example  a court  applying an  "amount in controversy"  min-
imum or a rule  barring  "frivolous"  claims.  The  usage is  derived  from  G.  CALABRFs,
supra note 85, at 95-96.
110.  See notes  87,  89 supra  and accompanying text.
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unhappily  low  income.  When  someone  speaks  of  a  state  of  'func-
tional  indigency,'  and  says  that for persons in that state pricing  works
obtusely as a resource allocator and ad hoe  collective  appraisals of com-
parative  utilities  would  work  better,  what  the  speaker  means  is  that
he thinks  the net sum  of social  welfare  would  be  higher  if  the 'func-
tionally  indigent'  person had more  purchasing  power.  Now  the  eco-
nomically  preferable  way  to  redistribute  purchasing  power  from  the
better to the worse-off  is by transfers  in the form  of  money,  not par-
ticular  goods  or  services,  because  money  allows  the  recipient  who
knows  best  what  he  wants  to  spend  his  additional  income  as  he
chooses.  But the question  of general  monetary  transfers  must be  left
up to the legislature;  and if such transfers  do not occur,  or do not oc-
cur in the  magnitudes  that some  would  recommend,  we can  only con-
clude that the people  of the state, speaking through the legislature,  are
satisfied with the present distribution of income."
Thus  there  appears  to  be  an  economic  goal  which  can  provide
a  close-fitting  justification  for  the  state's  insistence  on  application  of
court  access  fees  even  to its  most impoverished  citizens,  a goal  other
than the  pursuit of allocative  efficiency.  This  goal  is the stabilization
of  some  supposedly  preferred  distributional  outcome.  In  the  Boddie,
Bullock and Griffin cases,  and more  generally  in  the Rodriguez dicta,
the  Supreme  Court  can  be  understood  as  treating  such  a stabilization
goal,  along  with  that  of  "administrative  convenience,"  as  one  which
cannot justify a  governmentally  imposed  restriction  on  the  exercise  or
enjoyment  of  a constitutionally  protected  right or  interest.  The  very
making  of  that  comparison  suggests  that  the Justices  may  simply  not
take the  stabilization  goal  very  seriously,  perhaps because  their  obser-
vations  and impressions  of our political processes  leave them  seriously
doubtful  that the  distribution  which  results  from the market  as  modi-
fied  by legislated  transfer  programs  is  in  any  intelligible  sense  "pre-
ferred"  to  that which results  if, say,  indigents  are  granted  free  access
to the courts.  Such  doubts which would be all the more warranted in-
sofar as  the  Constitution's  intimations of special  regard for an  interest
such  as that in litigation  access  are  themselves  to be  supposed  consti-
tutive of societal preferences.
In the  final  analysis,  I do not see how it can be  denied  that the
Supreme  Court,  in the  decisions  I have  cited,  has  in  effect been  sug-
gesting  that the  Constitution  contains  an  itemized  list  of some  of  the
components  of an ideal concept of minimum  economic  capacity.",  So
111.  Similar results follow  from an  analysis of  the  related  concept  of equal  oppor-
tunity.  See  Richards,  Equal Opportunity and  School  Financing:  Towards a  Moral
Theory of Constitutional  Adjudication,  41 U. Cm. L. REv. 32  (1973).
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those  who  are  startled  may  have reason  to  be  startled.  And  all  of
us  can  continue  to  ponder  the  puzzle,  to  which  I  have  previously
called  attention,  of what  the  "state  action"  part of  fourteenth  amend-
ment liability can possibly mean in the  context of a constitutional pur-




I  have  presented  a  two-step  argument  for  the  proposition  that
court access  fees may not constitutionally be applied to those who  can-
not  afford to  pay  them:  first, there  is  a doctrine  opposed  to govern-
mentally imposed fees which have the effect  of excluding  indigent per-
sons  from the enjoyment  of constitutionally  favored  interests;  second,
persons  do  have  a  constitutionally  favored  interest  in a standing  op-
portunity  to  avail themselves  of  whatever  juridical  processes  are  nor-
mally available to members of the community." 3
Now I  am  aware that these  propositions,  and others  of their kind
carry  in  their  train  a  riddle:  How  is  it possible  to  provide  effective
juridical  access  for  the  necessitous,  by  a  fair  method  that  assures
against the  two related  evils  of prodigal  or prohibitive  expense  and-
especially-of  over-compensating  the necessitous  at the  expense  of the
borderline  poor, not to mention the so-called  affluent?  It is  the riddle
of  what  to  substitute  for  salutary  economic  deterrence,  when  use
of economic  deterrence  is  constitutionally  disallowed  against  the  func-
tionally  indigent.114  An imaginable  answer,  assuming that  ,the attack
is  confined  to  state-imposed  access  fees,  would  be that  the  problem
surely  will  not materialize  as  long  as  no public  provision is made  for
equipage." 5   Relief  from  access  fees  alone,  it  might  be  argued  with
some  plausibility,  will  open no  floodgates  of frivolous  litigation.  But
that answer  would  be  merely  facetious  on  the part  of  one  who,  like
myself, is not ready to deny that the right of effective  access does truly
encompass  provision  for  equipage,  too  (though  whether  or  how  the
courts  should undertake  enforcement  of the equipage part of the right
is another question)."'
112.  See  Michelman,  Foreword:  On Protecting the  Poor Through the  Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv.  L. REV. 7,  11,  13,  31-32, 39,  55-56  (1969).
113.  Or  at least  persons  have  a  constitutionally  favored  interest  in  receiving  some
sort of  fair hearing  when they  assert  legal grievances.  See  notes  83-84  supra and  ac-
companying text.
114.  But it is not  completely  disallowed.  See  Fuller  v. Oregon,  42  U.S.L.W.  4770
(U.S.  May 20, 1974), upholding a "recoupment"  scheme.
115.  See Part  I, at 1163.
116.  For discussion  of some  possible  justiciable  handles  on the problem,  see  Brick-
man, supra note 31,  at 641-49.
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The fact may be that the deterrence problem is not fully soluble at
the  level  of  constitutional  adjudication,  where  courts  decide  whether
to  recognize  or  not  to  recognize  claimed  constitutional  rights.  The
problem  is  thus  intractable because  it is,  as  it  crops  up  in  these  con-
texts,  a  mere  symptom  of an  underlying,  for  all I  know  ineradicable,
element  in the organization  of our  society  and,  for  all I know, of  all
imaginable  modem  societies.  That  element  is  simply  that  some  per-
sons find themselves in the predicament of functional indigency.
That the existence  of functional indigency  is the key to  the deter-
rence riddle may easily be seen.  If there were no persons  in that state,
there would be nothing  in the way of the state's  rationing access  to  its
scarce  or  costly  facilities  by  a price  mechanism.  Everyone  would  be
able  to  pay  for  constitutionally  guaranteed  access,  and  still  provide
himself  with  the  other  necessities.  Everyone,  then,  could  fairly  be
subjected  to  economic  deterrence  and  the  riddle  would  be  solved.
On the other hand,  the existence of functional  indigency  seems  to
be  an injustice  by  definition." 7   Claims  to free  access  for  the  func-
tionally indigent-the  very  claims  that stir  up the  deterrence  problem
-of  course  are  rooted  in  that  very  perception  of  injustice.  So  the
riddle  posed  by free  access  claims  is a riddle,  one  might  say,  with  a
moral function-a riddle that pricks our social conscience.
There  are  times,  and  the  Kras/Ortwein episode  strikes  me  as
one of them,  when  courts seem  to be  acting  as  though it were an  ele-
vated form of judicial artistry  to  help us  block out troublesome  moral
riddles-an effect which a court can  achieve by  studiously refusing  to
name  a right a right,  to name  an injustice  an  injustice.  Now  is that
the judiciary's mission:  moral anaesthesiology?  Or is it not a high ju-
dicial  function,  when  the context is  appropriately  judicial  and  the  le-
gal  merits  are  tolerably  clear,  to  confront  us  with-not  to  save  us
from-the riddles that prick our consciences?
APPENDIX:  REMEDIAL  SELF-HELP  AND  "STATE
ACTION"
In this appendix  I consider in  somewhat speculative  fashion the propo-
sition that private actions  causing harm to others become  "state action"  cov-
ered  by the procedural  due  process  guaranty,  as  soon  as  remedial  justifica-
tions are summoned  to purge such actions  of a  wrongful, liability-producing,
quality they would otherwise have." 8
117.  That  is,  a  person  is  called  functionally  indigent  when  he  cannot  afford  the
prices normally charged for all the goods  and  benefits to which he is justly entitled.
118.  A remedial  justification  is  one  referring  to  an  inequity  previously  introduced
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The  argument for this proposition partakes  of the "public  function"  or
"state function"  approach  to the  question  of  "state  action."" 9   In  a  some-
what superficial  vein,  the  claim would  be  that coercive  correction  of  inter-
personal inequity--call  it corrective  justice-is  intrinsically,  by its  very na-
ture,  the  proper  business  of  the  state,  so  that  when  self-interested  private
agents  are permitted (and thereby,  to some  extent, encouraged)  to take  cor-
rective  action  on their  own  behalf  ("self-help"),  the  state  must  be  viewed
as  having  "delegated"  the  function  of  securing  corrective  justice  to  such
agents,  for reasons  of  efficiency  or whatever.  One  need not  argue  that the
state's  responsiblity  for  corrective  justice  is  a "non-delegable"  one  in  order
to maintain  that procedural  safeguards  which  attend this function  when per-
formed by state  officials  must follow  along when  the function  is  shifted  to
private agents.
Of  course  the  claim  that  corrective  justice  is  "intrinsically"  a  state
function requires  support.  Not much is  added by a bare assertion that there
is  a general  understanding to  this  effect  (though there  may  be  one),  or that
the social contract so stipulates.  But the contractarian  tradition does suggest
some important reasons  why the  function  of  corrective  justice  might be re-
garded  as  allocated  to the  state,  at least in  the  sense  that procedural  safe-
guards  applicable  to  "state"  action  must  attend  this  function  whoever  may
be called upon, or allowed, to perform it.
Contractarians,  certainly  those  of  the  Lockean  mainstream,  tend  to
view  the  problem  of  corrective  justice  as  perhaps  the premier  impediment
to  satisfactory  social life  in the  state  of nature.  It is  all  very  well to  say
that one who has suffered violation of his natural rights  may punish  or exact
reparation from the violator; but there remains  the universally perceived diffi-
culty  of an  extreme likelihood  of  disagreement  about  the question  of viola-
tion or the appropriate  measure  of requital, leading  to endless  chains  of cor-
rective  countermeasures  and  quite  undermining  the  conditions  of  security
and  social peace.  The felt  need  for  an  authoritative  and  impartial  forum
for control  of such  disputes-an  essential  and  integral  component  of  which
is a fair hearing for each disputant-is  a main prop  of the libertarian  justi-
fication of the state.1 20
Only  minor  expansion  of  this  simple  insight  is  needed  to  support  a
strong argument  that corrective  "self-help"  ought to  be deemed  state  action
for purposes  of  procedural  due  process  guaranties.  Viewing  the  situation
from the  agent's  standpoint,  it makes  good  sense  to  fear  that normally  ef-
ficacious  restraints  on private  actions  calculated  to  harm  another,  including
both conscientious  self-restraint  and  extralegally  manifested  community  dis-
approbation,  will  tend  to  wear  thin  where  the  circumstances  of  corrective
into the  relationship between  agent and victim, which  inequity the action under scrutiny
is designed to correct or resolve.
119.  See, e.g., Clark & Landers, supra  note 41, at 377-82.
120.  See generally R. NOZICK, ANARCHY,  STATE,  AND  UTOPIA  (1974).
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justice  apparently  prevail.  It is  perhaps  all  too  easy  to  persuade  oneself
of  the  appropriateness  of one's  conduct where  a remedial justification  beck-
ons,  and  also  too easy  to believe  that if  one  does  err  the  community's  ad-
verse  judgment  will  tend  to  focus  on  the  mistake  of  judgment-a  merely
instrumental defect-rather  than on one's innate lawlessness  or moral defect.
The mistake will be "deplorable" but "understandable,"  and it will not deep-
ly taint the agent's  public character  or self-image.  From the victim's  stand-
point,  the  emotional  response  to having been  visited  with  harm  under  the
false  pretense  of  punishment  or  requital  may  be  more  acute  than  the  re-
sponse  to  injury heedlessly,  or brutishly,  or  churlishly  inflicted.  Heedless-
ness  surely is less  fruitful  of resentment  than design-a  truth illustrated  by
the social practice  of apology.  At the same time, those who injure brutishly
or churlishly thereby indicate their moral inferiority and  are perhaps for that
reason  less  resented-one  can partially  assuage  one's  injury  by  retreat  to
the  attitude  of moral  superiority,  and  at least  one's  own  character  has  not
been  placed  in  question  by  acceptance  of  injury  having  a  corrective  look
about it.  It  is far  harder  to  turn  the  other  cheek  to  those  who  purport,
though  with  doubtful  justification,  to  be  wreaking  just  deserts  upon  one.
And  a  chief  strain in  the  special  resentment  stirred  by unjustified  requital
certainly will be-if it is true-that  one has not had,  and is  not to 'be given,
a fair opportunity  to  show  that  the requital  is  truly  undeserved.  In  sum,
there  may be special  risks, both of the incidence  of unjustifiable  injury  and
also  of  socially  debilitating  emotional  responses  to  such  injuries,  associated
with  any  suggestion  that  an  injurious  action  is remedial  or  corrective;  and
the nature of these special risks points straight  to a "due  process"  transaction
as the appropriate risk-reducing measure.
The practical  implications of  all this are  uncertain.  On one view,  they
are staggering.  Since  a large proportion  of privately inflicted, non-accidental
harms are imaginably  or potentially remedial, it might follow that  every such
harm could be brought  as  a federal case-a deprivation without due process
because  of  failure  to  provide  a  prior hearing.  This  seems  inconceivable.
Thus  to  give  the notion  of  corrective  justice  as  a state  function  some  bite,
we might repair to the more modest proposition that the due process require-
ment  attaches  only  to  such  injurious  actions  as  are  purportedly remedial.
But this formulation  seems,  as  a practical  matter,  to boil  down to  the pro-
position that  a victim  who  becomes  a plaintiff  in  a civil  action  has  a  due
process  right  not to  have  his  action  defeated  by  a  remedial  justification,
unless he had a prior opportunity for a hearing satisfying the formal require-
ments of due process.
Such  a proposition,  if legally  sound,  would  not be without  important
consequences.  It would,  for example,  have  the effect  of  emasculating  sec-
tion 9-503  of the  Uniform  Commercial  Code  and  all  other  state-law  doc-
trines designed to allow self-help.  But there  is no self-evident  logic connect-
ing the proposition  with  a  general  right  on the part  of  would-be  plaintiffs
not to be prevented by access fees from bringing their actions.
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